Land & Water Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 1

1983

Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract
Carrier Regulation under the Federal Power and Natural Gas Acts
Harvey L. Reiter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Reiter, Harvey L. (1983) "Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract Carrier
Regulation under the Federal Power and Natural Gas Acts," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 18 : Iss. 1 , pp.
1 - 80.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Reiter: Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract C
University of Wyoming
College of Law

LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
983

VOLUME XV1I

NUMBER I

Today, consumers of natural gas and electricity are beset by everIncreasing prices for those commodities. In this article the author exam.
ines the extent to which federal regulation can provide relief from
high prices by enhancing competition. In particular, the author exam.
ines the importance and the scope of the FERC's role as a guardian
of competition in regulated energy Industries.

COMPETITION AND ACCESS TO THE
BOTTLENECK: THE SCOPE OF
CONTRACT CARRIER REGULATION
UNDER THE FEDERAL POWER AND
NATURAL GAS ACTS
Harvey L. Reiter*
Regulators, it has been observed, are well advised to
consider carefully the benefits that competition might bring
to the industries that they regulate.' Deregulation is often
the buzzword applied, yet its connotations are misleading;
they suggest that the solution to poor performance in a regulated industry is simply to remove regulation altogether.
This may work well in those industries not characterized by
high entry barriers, enormous scale economies, or seller concentration. Airlines and trucking are examples often cited.
Copyright@ 1982 by Harvey L Reiter

*Special Assistant to the Deputy General Counsel for Litigation, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. B.A., 1972 Michigan State University;
J.D., 1975 Boston University School of Law. I wish to express thanks to
Daniel Watkiss, John Flynn and Phillip Marston for their helpful comments
and suggestions. Special thanks go to my wife Wendy for her helpful criticisms and for her enduring patience.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
1. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 185-86 (1982). (Mr. Breyer is now
a judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals).
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On the other hand, where enhancing competition is the
regulator's goal, deregulation may be precisely the wrong
answer in those industries characterized by vertical integration and natural monopoly in one or more of the steps in
the vertical chain of production Here, the telecommunications industry provides the classic example. No one today
would suggest that telephone equipment need be supplied
by only a single firm. Yet it was federal regulation that
ended AT&T's restrictions on customer-owned telephones and
other attachments,' thereby permitting the introduction of
competition for the sale and production of that equipment.
The distinction between deregulation and regulation to
enhance competition is best observed in the electric utility
and natural gas industries. There have been calls in both
for the deregulation of electric generation and of natural
gas prices. Quite understandably, there have been no serious
proposals advanced to deregulate electric power transmission or gas pipeline transportation, areas of traditional governmental regulation. It is in the areas of pipeline transportation and electric power transmission, however, that the
key to enhancing competition in these industries lies.
This article focuses upon the question of access to gas
pipelines and electric transmission networks by non-owners
seeking access to new markets or to alternate suppliers. It
begins with an outline of the competitive structures of the
two industries and the importance of access to promoting
competition in each. Next, the article turns to an examination of the limits of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's 4 statutory jurisdiction to address these issues un2. Judge Breyer makes this same observation, noting that where natural
monopoly exists and is significant, the facts produce a regulatory problem
and "classical regulation is likely to be appropriate for part of the industry." Id. at 314.
3. See In the Matter of Carterphone, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968) ; See also BREYER,
supra note 1, at 285-314.
4. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was created on October 1,
1977, pursuant to Section 401 of the Department of Energy Organization
Act, (42 U.S.C. § 7171 (1977)) and Executive Order No. 12,009, 42 Fed.
Reg. 46,267 (1977). It succeeded to most of the functions previously administered by the Federal Power Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a) (1977).
Unless otherwise noted, when used throughout this article, the term "Commission" refers to the Federal Power Commission ("FPC") or Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") depending upon whether events

or decisions referred to occurred before or after October 1, 1977.
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der the Federal Power and Natural Gas Acts. Finally the
article discusses proposals for facilitating access arrangements under existing law.
THE ROLE OF COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED
ELECTRIC UTILITY AND NATURAL GAS
PIPELINE INDUSTRIES

It is by now a settled proposition that competition, for
better or worse, enjoys a protected status in the functioning
of the electric utility and natural gas pipeline industries.
It is a role protected by the antitrust laws, the existence of
federal regulation notwithstanding.' Regulation, moreover,
must take into account the policies underlying the antitrust
laws. Federal Power and Natural Gas Act terms such as
"public convenience and necessity," "justness and reasonableness" and "public interest" derive their meaning from
various federal policies, including those fundamental national economic policies underlying the antitrust laws.' The
Supreme Court has observed that the history of Part II of
the Federal Power Act, for example, "indicates an overriding policy of maintaining competition to the maximum extent possible consistent with the public interest."' The Court
has described the FERC's role as the "first line of defense
against those competitive practices that might later be the
subject of antitrust proceedings." 8 Indeed, the public interest requires that antitrust policy may have to be considered sua sponte by the agency even where no party has
raised the issue.' Although the message seems to have been
less than enthusiastically received by the Federal Power
Commission" (as is evinced by numerous court cases involv5. California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Corp., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399
F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); City
of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
6. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973). See also NAACP v.
FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976); FPC v. Conway Corp., 425 U.S. 271 (1976).
7. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 US. at 374 (1973).
8. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. at 760 (1973)
9. Marine Space Enclosures v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
10. Gainesville Utilities Dep't v. Florida Power Corp., the Supreme Court's
landmark decision on the scope of Commission authority to order and es-
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ing that agency)," its successor, the FERC, has been more
receptive to consideration of competition's role and apparently more philosophically inclined to endorse its potential
benefits for the regulated industries. 2
The ways in which competition operates in the electric
utility and natural gas pipeline industries are the subjects
of discussion in numerous cases and articles and will not be
treated exhaustively here. 3 Nevertheless the subject merits
tablish the terms of interconnection between utilities, is an interesting case
in point. 402 U.S. 515 (1971). In the initial litigation before the FPC, the
City of Gainesville had sought interconnection with the larger Florida
Power Corporation system, which the Company would have agreed to if the
City, in turn, had agreed to a territorial division of service areas. No agreement was reached and the Commission ultimately ordered the interconnection without the territorial agreement. Deletion of the territorial restriction
was not premised on its potential anticompetitive consequences, but for
precisely the opposite reason-in the FPC's view "the continued isolation
of Gainesville [i.e., non-interconnected operation] [would] lead only to a
more aggressive competition" by the City to increase its load and thereby
justify larger, more efficient plants. Gainesville Utilities Dep't v. Florida
Power Corp., 40 F.P.C. 1227, 1242 (1968). See also Village of Elbow Lake
v. Otter Tail Power Co., 46 F.P.C. 675 (1971), aff'd in part, remanded in
part, Otter Tail Power Co. v. FPC, 473 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1973). In this
case, the Commission ordered an interconnection arrangement between Otter
Tail and the newly formed municipal electric system of the Village of Elbow
Lake under which Otter Tail would provide Elbow Lake with wholesale
power. The Commission concluded that an interconnection was necessary
to assure reliable electric service to the village, but charged Elbow Lake
with an "ill-advised incursion into the power business," warning that its
order "must not invite improvident ventures elsewhere." 46 F.P.C. at 67778. Otter Tail, which had refused to sell or wheel wholesale power to the
Village, was ultimately found to have violated the Sherman Act by its
conduct preventing the development of competing distribution systems.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
11. It apparently took several trips to court, including two to the Supreme
Court, to fully convince the FPC of its statutory mandate to consider antitrust policy in the public interest equation. See FPC v. Conway Corp.,
425 U.S. 271 (1976); Gulf States Utiilties Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973);
Northern Natural Gas Corp. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
12. In Gulf States Utilities Co., the FERC first articulated a "least anti-competitive alternatives" test in adopting a per se rule against direct resale
restrictions imposed by utilities on the wholesale customers. 5 F.E.R.C.
61,066 (1978). The Commission there concluded that because of the salutary effect of competition on the rates and performance of regulated utilities, competitive restraints would only be tolerated where they served a
legitimate business purpose and did so in the least anticompetitive manner.
Id. at 61,098. Resale restrictions, the Commission held, might serve legitimate planning purposes but were deemed "unnecessarily blunt" devices
which would impede competition. The Commission again articulated this
test in Florida Power & Light Co. holding that competitive restraints would
not be tolerated unless justified by "overriding public policy objectives"
achieved by the least anticompetitive method. No. ER 78-19 (FERC order
issued Aug. 3, 1979), 32 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th 313, 313-15 (1979). This test
was reaffirmed in City of Frankfort v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 12 F.E.R.C.
61,173 (1982).
61,004 (1980), vacated on other grounds, 20 F.E.R.C.
13. See, e.g., Hughes, Scale Frontiers in Electric Power, in TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 44 (Brookings Institute 1971); Schwartz,
Pricing and Competition in the Regulated Energy Industries, in NEW
DIMENSIONS IN PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING 555 (Michigan State University
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some discussion, particularly insofar as it relates to the
manner in which the transportation of gas and the transmission of electricity for others affect the feasibility of competition in the electric and natural gas industries.
Electric Utility Competition
The electric utility business can be functionally divided
into three separate operations: generation, transmission, and
distribution of power. While the vast majority of electric
consumers are served by large, vertically integrated utilities,' there exist a substantial number of utilities, most publicly owned, engaged solely in the distribution of power purchased at wholesale from the vertically integrated systems."
In addition, other utilities are partially integrated, generating only a portion of their load and purchasing the rest
from others."6 Still other utilities, such as the Tennessee
Valley Authority, are essentially wholesale power suppliers
with no significant retail service responsibilities.'
Retail Competition
Competition among electric utilities at the retail
level is a ubiquitous phenomenon.'" While its intensity
may vary from region to region," the FERC has established a presumption of its existence, observing that
1976); Weiss, Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 135 (Brookings Institute 1975);

14.

15.

16.
17.

18.
19.

Fairman and Scott, Transmission, Power Pools and Competition in the
Electric Utility Industry, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (1977); Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 64 (1972); Essay, Efficiency and Competition in the Electric Power Industry, 88 YALE L.J. 1511 (1979).
Of the nation's 3,500 electric utilities, the 200 largest systems provide over
90 percent of the generating capacity and account for service to 80 percent
of ultimate consumer load. Power Pooling in the United States, FERC
STAFF REPORT 5, ch. 2 [hereinafter cited as Pooling Study].
Only one quarter of the 2,200 state and municipally owned electric systems
generate their own power. The more than 1,000 rural electric cooperative
systems likewise depend upon wholesale suppliers for 98 percent of their
total energy needs. Id. at 6.
id.
Essay, supra note 13, at 1541-42. Another federal power agency, the Bonneville Power Administration, serves primarily as a power broker whose
essential business is the transmission of power. (See Florida Power & Light
Co., No. ER 78-19 (Phase I) (filed testimony of Dr. Gordon Taylor, Staff
Economist, FERC), Tr. 1522.
See Curtis, Report to Congress, Decisional Delay in Wholesale Electric
Rate Increase Cases: Causes, Consequences and Possible Remedies at 23-29
(January 23, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Curtis Report].
Pooling Study, supra note 14, ch. 8 at 61-68.
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it would be a "rare case" in which no such competition
would be found."0 As the Commission defines it, retail competition among electric utilities need not consist of active
rivalry.2 1 The presence of competition rests upon the existence of actual or potential alternative sources of supply.
That in turn is established by the close proximity of two or
more utility service areas or by proof that one or more utilities would be possible candidates to take over another utility's
retail loads if that utility were to go out of business or otherwise discontinue serving its retail customers." Thus, retail
competition may take the form of franchise contests, pitting
private utilities against local government-owned alternatives," or of rivalry for the patronage of large industrial
customers considering neighboring service areas as location
or relocation options. 4
Wholesale Competition
With the exception of fringe area and head-to-head
rivalry" among utilities, competition at the retail level is
20. Connecticut Light and Power Co., No. ER 78-517 (FERC Order issued Aug.
20, 1979), slip op. at 10 n.24, 31 PuB. UTIL. REP. 4th 315, 320-22 (1979).
21. Id. The records in several cases indicate that there often is no shortage of
intensity. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co., No. ER78-19 (FERC Order
issued Aug. 3, 1979), 32 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th 313 (1979); Southern Cal.
Edison Co., No. ER76-205 (FERC Order issued Aug. 22, 1979), aff'd sub
nom., City of Anaheim v. FERC, 669 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Toledo
Edison Co., 10 N.R.C. 265 (1979); Consumer's Power Co., 6 N.R.C. 892
(1977).
22. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 10 F.E.R.C. % 61,260 (1980); Commonwealth
Edison Co., No. 63 (FERC Opinion issued Sept. 14, 1979); Connecticut
Light and Power Co., 31 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th 815, 321-22 (1979). Recognizing the unique nature of electric utility competition, the Second Circuit
recently adopted the Commission's functional definition. City of Groton v.
Connecticut Light and Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 930 (2d Cir. 1981).
23. For example, citizens dissatisfied with service from their publicly owned
distribution system may opt for takeover of their system by the surrounding
private utility. See e.g., Citizens for Allegan County v. FkvC, 414 F.2d 1125
(D.C. Cir. 1969). Similarly, communities served at retail by a vertically
integrated private utility may seek to condemn its facilities in their area
and establish a government owned system as did the citizens in Elbow Lake,
Minnesota. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
24. See, e.g., FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
25. The Yale Essay author notes that competing distribution systems (wholly
duplicative systems that compete door to door or "head to head") exist in
fewer than 30 communities in the United States. Essay, supra note 13, at
1521 n.50. Competition on a head-to-head basis may also occur between
utilities at the fringes of their service territories or for individual industrial customers. Curtis Report, supra note 18, at 24-26. Not to be discounted is the competitive potential of power produced by non-utilities.
Cogenerators-those firms producing electric power as a by-product of
some industrial or commercial process-and small producers of energy for
renewable resources-such as solar and hydroelectric plants-are given
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largely confined to contests for control over local distribution monopolies; there is little of the battle for the patronage
of individual customers one associates with conventional
forms of competition. Wholesale competition between utilities, on the other hand, exhibits more of the traditional characteristics of competitive behavior.
The feasibility of competition between power suppliers
at the wholesale level rests upon the existence of transmislinks developments
between the power source and the customer. Techsion
nological
in the transmission of power at high
voltages make possible the economic movement of power
over great distances,"0 enabling a system like San Diego Gas
and Electric Company, for example, to purchase power from
sources as far-flung as British Columbia and Canada 7 to
the north, Mexico 8 to the south, and Arizona" to the east of
its service area.
Competition at the wholesale level is not a recent phenomenon. Battles between federal power marketing agencies
and privately owned utilities for the business of municipal
distribution systems are documented back to the 1940's and
earlier.3 0 In addition, several cases before the NRC and the
FPC have identified yet another wholesale power market,
the market for "coordination services."'"
various incentives to develop production facilities under the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (Supp. IV, 1980).
26. Curtis Report, supra note 18, at 31 (citing CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON NATIONAL ENERGY TRANSPORTATION
(1977)).

27. San Diego Gas and Electric Company FERC Form 1, 1979 ANN. REP. 422
[hereinafter cited as SDG&E ANNUAL REPORT].
28. Testimony of Jack Thomas, Vice President-Electric, San Diego Gas &
Electric Co., before the FERC in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., FERC No. E-7777
(II), Transcript (Consol. Helms) 1930, 1933.
29. SDG&E ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 422.
30. See, e.g., REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF THE TENNESSEV

VALLEY AUTHORITY, S. Doc. No. 56, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in
Flynn and Schwartz, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 824-31
(1977 ed.); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 2 F.P.C. 392 (1941); Curtis Report,
supra note 18, at 29.
31. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co., 6 N.R.C. 892 (1977); Toledo Edison Co.,
10 N.R.C. 265 (1979); Florida Power & Light Co., No. ER 78-19 (FERC
Order issued Aug. 3, 1979), 32 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th 313 (1979); City of
61,004 (1980), vacated
Frankfort v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 12 F.E.R.C.

in part on other grounds, 20 F.E.R.C.

61,173 (1982).
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Participants in the coordination services market often
act both as buyers and sellers, 2 supplementing their own
generating capacity with short term power purchases during periods of scheduled maintenance on their facilities as
well as during system emergencies.3 " Similarly, energy may
be purchased when available to displace more costly generation on a utility's own system; this is usually referred to
as an economy energy transaction. 4 In addition, utilities
may attempt to meet their long term needs through the purchase of entitlements, reserved shares of generating capacity,
out of specified generating units owned by others. They may
also seek to obtain or dispose of part ownership in units otherwise too large or too expensive to finance for an individual
system. A recently released pooling study undertaken by
the FERC staff identified some significant competition for
these longer term power purchases in the Northeastern
United States.5 According to the study, such competition
was possible in large part due to the ready access of participants to the transmission network."
The Importance of Transmission Access to Wholesale
Competition
As Professor James Meeks observed in his oft cited
"Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The
Impact of Antitrust Policy," the transmission of electric
power is generally acknowledged to possess natural monopoly
characteristics." This, he noted, is observable from the in32. This is not an absolute requirement however. It is feasible for a nongenerating entity to assemble a bulk power package of coordination services
choosing from among various suppliers to meet its full requirements. Thus,
for example, the cities of Anaheim and Riverside, California purchase the
bulk of their power needs from the Southern California Edison Company,
but when cheaper, non-firm economy energy is available from Nevada
Power Company, it is used to displace energy purchases from Edison. Testimony of Everett C. Ross, Director of Public Utilities Department, Riverside, California, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., FERC No. E-7777 (II), Transcript
(Consol. Helms) 2139; Testimony of Gordon W. Hoyt, General Manager,
Public Utilities Department, Anaheim, California, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
Id. at 2160.
33. See Pooling Study, supra note 14, ch. 3.
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id. at 66-67.
36. Id.
37. Meeks, supra note 13. Natural monopolies are characterized by decreasing
unit costs as output increases over the range of production. See Kahn, 1
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 119 (1971).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/1

8

Reiter: Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract C
CONTRACT CARRIER REGULATION

1983

efficiency and high societal costs of duplicating existing
transmission grids and from the policies of state regulatory
agencies which prohibit unnecessary duplication of facilities.
Economies of scale, environmental and land use considerations, and absolute cost levels render duplicate transmission
lines uneconomic and inefficent5s
The transmission networks of large, vertically integrated utility systems, which cannot be practically duplicated
by competitors, have often been described as "bottleneck"
facilities giving their owners a "strategic dominance" over
competitors. 9 This strategic dominance enables the owner
to exclude competitors from access to alternative supplies,
thereby bestowing monopoly power upon it. 4" According to
Professor Meeks, "the monopoly over transmission by vertically integrated systems presents the most serious obstacle
to potential competition."41 As the FERC observed in Florida
Power & Light Co., a monopolist may effectively deny access
by the imposition of impractical terms and prices as readily
as by outright refusals.2
The necessity for broad transmission access is widely
acknowledged as a prerequisite to wholesale competition.
Many recent proposals for deregulation or divestiture of the
electric utility industry foresee long term advantages in
competition among power producers compared to the present regulatory scheme.4" These benefits, the advocates argue,
38. Id. at 91.
39. Pooling Study, supra note 14, at 49; Essay, supra note 13, at 1522-23;
Meeks, supra note 13.
40. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. at 377 (1973);
Florida Power & Light Co., No. ER 78-19 (FERC Order issued Aug. 3,
1979), 32 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th 313 (1979); Consumers Power Co., 6 N.R.C.
at 997-1008; Essay, supra note 13, at 1523.
41. Meeks, supra note 13, at 87.
42. Florida Power & Light Co., No. ER 78-19 (FERC Order issued Aug. 3,
1979), 32 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th at 339 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927)).
43. Bohn, Tabors, Golub, and Schweppe, Deregulating the Electric Utility Industry, MIT Energy Laboratory Technical Report No. MIT-EL-82-003
(January 1982); Economics Division, Edison Electric Institute, Deregulation of Electric Utilities, A Survey of Major Concepts and Issues, (July
1981); A New Route for Decontrolling Gas, Bus. WK. 50, June 29, 1981;
J. Plummer, Scenarios for Deregulation of Electric Utilities, Electric Power
Research Institute (November 1981) (unpublished article) ; W. Gillen, A
Consideration of Deregulation of Electric Generation (May 1981) (paper
for Argonne National Laboratory). FERC Commissioner David R. Hughes
has taken a particular interest in the possibilities of divestiture and deregu-
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will redound to both financially strapped utilities and retail
consumers." Inherent in most of these proposals, however,
is the recognition that competition will be feasible and deregulation acceptable, only if the transmission networks now
dominated by the largest utilities are required to provide
substantially greater access, and perhaps even subjected to
divestiture.'
The Natural Gas Industry
Like the electric utility industry, the natural gas industry is readily divided into categories of production, transportation and distribution." Indeed the functional separation is more complete, for while entities engaged in any one
aspect of the business may be affiliated with others elsewhere on the vertical chain," pipelines, producers and distributors largely retain their individual corporate identity
and organization."
lation of electric utilities. See, e.g., Remarks by Commissioner David

44.

45.

46.
47.

48.

Hughes, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, American Bar Association National Institute, Elements of Utility Rate Proceedings, Washington,
D.C. (March 13, 1981); Speech by Commissioner David Hughes, Innovation in Energy Policy and Research, Third International Conference of
Energy Use Management, Berlin, West Germany (Oct. 29, 1981).
The President of Virginia Electric & Power Company (VEPCO), William
W. Berry, has been the utility industry's most outspoken advocate of electric generating deregulation and was the first major electric utility executive to publicly support the concept. Knight, Vepco Chief Advocates Electricity Deregulation, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1981, at D8. Berry argues that
competition among independent generators with free entry and no obligation
to serve and access to regional transmission networks will spur efficiency
with resulting longer term rates lower than those likely under continued
regulation. This will also result in returns commensurate with stockholder
needs. Remarks of William W. Berry, President Virginia Electric and
Power Company, Edison Electric Institute Financial Conference, Palm
Beach, Florida (Oct. 6, 1981); Remarks by William W. Berry, National
Economic Research Associates Deregulation Workshop (June 5, 1981).
See, e.g., Essay, supra note 13, at 1534 n.121, 1541; Address by George R.
Hall, Deregulation of Electric Generation: Some Cautionary Considerations, Fourth Annual Utility Regulatory Conference, Public Utilities Reports. Washington, D.C. (October 2, 1981).
1 FPC NAT'L GAS SURVEY, COMM'N REP. 53 (1975).
For example pipelines may own interests 2n gas production companies. In
fact all the major interstate gas pipelines (Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Company, United Gas Pipeline Company, Columbia Gas Transmission Company, El Paso Natural Gas Company, etc.) have substantial exploration,
development and production affiliates. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 573-74.
Some pipelines also operate distribution systems. Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Pipeline Company is one such system. See Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Pipeline Co., 4 F.E.R.C. %61,318 (1978). Finally distributors and even direct
end users may and are in fact encouraged to develop their own sources of
gas. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 575; 45 Fed. Reg. 5362 (1978) codified
at 18 C.F.R. § 2.79 (1982).
1 FPC NAT'L GAS SURVEY, supra note 46, at 53-55.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/1

10

Reiter: Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract C

1983

CONTRACT CARRIER REGULATION

11

Competition Among Gas Pipelines
Competition among natural gas pipelines takes two
basic forms: competition to secure new gas supplies and
competition to supply customers. The latter form of competition has occupied a long-recognized place high on the list
of economic values protected by antitrust law and policy.
As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted in City of Pitts4 and again in Northern Natural Gas Co. v.
burgh v. FPC,
FPC,50 competition and regulation are complementary forces;
the potential benefits to consumers of competition among
pipelines are not to be lightly regarded. 1
When gas pipelines compete for gas supplies, the competition is often quite intense. Former FERC economist
Robert Anderson" in a February 10, 1982 speech before the
Symposium on Problems of Regulated Industries,"s noted
that although the Overthrust Belt in the Rocky Mountain
states is a major new gas producing area, only a few pipelines
are able to transport natural gas from this area. Other major
pipelines are interested in this gas, but must either construct their own duplicate pipelines or obtain transportation
service over the existing facilities of other pipelines. 4 In
49. 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
50. 399 F.2d 953, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
51. The court in Northern Natural Gas, observed that the certification of two
pipelines to serve a given market could provide incentives for the pipelines
to contain costs and improve service in order to retain and attract customers. This same perceived benefit formed the basis of the Supreme
Court's decision to reject the merger of the El Paso and Pacific Northwest
natural gas pipeline systems as violitive of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). The Court
had two years previously ruled that the FPC had improperly acted upon
El Paso's application to acquire the assets of Pacific Northwest Pipeline
Company without awaiting completion of the then ongoing antitrust proceedings. California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
52. Mr. Anderson, at the time the speech was given, was the Deputy Director
of FERC's Office of Regulatory Analysis.
53. Paper by Robert E. Anderson, Greater Access to TransportationServices
on Interstate Pipelines, Symposium on Problems of Regulated Industries,
Kansas City, Missouri, (Feb. 10, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Anderson].
54. Anderson, supra note 53, at 16. These circumstances apparently led Natural
Gas Pipeline Company (Natural) to file an antitrust suit with the U.S.
district court in Colorado charging that the Kansas-Nebraska Natural
Gas Company (K-N) had the only pipeline facilities which could be
utilized to transport gas owned by Natural and that K-N had refused to
transport the gas or else agreed to transport it on unreasonable terms in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
America v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., Inc., Pleading No. 80-K1222, (D. Colo. filed Sept. 16, 1980). Apparently the case was settled and
Natural's complaint was dismissed by stipulation in July 1981.
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addition, Anderson observed that with the partial decontrol
of natural gas prices under the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978,11 intrastate pipelines will be placed under substantial
pressure to secure adequate supplies in competition with
interstate pipelines, which enjoy an advantage due to their
substantial supplies of natural gas purchased under lower
regulated prices. 8 The FERC takes this point a step further, recently describing competition among gas pipelines
generally as "relentless"."
Competition Between Gas Pipelines and Customers
Since gas pipelines engage in both the sale and transportation of gas, they are often in direct competition with their
customers for gas supplies where those customers have direct access to alternate supplies of gas. 8 Large industrial
users, for example, faced frequent shortages and curtailments during the 1970's and view direct purchases as supplements to gas supplied by the pipeline. 9 Pursuant to its
Order 533,"° the FPC adopted a policy statement to encour15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980).
Anderson, supra note 53, at 9.
Statement of Policy, No. PL82-1-000 (FERC issued Feb. 4, 1982); 47 Fed.
30,336 (1982)
Reg. 6253 (Feb. 11, 1982) ; FERC Statutes and Regulations
[hereinafter cited as Policy Statement]. The Commission explains that because many pipelines with substantial quantities of gas under contract at
low regulated prices will be able to average these low prices with the relatively high prices of deregulated gas, these pipelines can be expected to bid
unregulated well prices considerably above long term market clearing levels.
FERC Statutes and Regulations at 30,104, 30,106, and 30,108.
The Antitrust Division has expressed a similar concern, particularly
where the result is that pipelines will increase their affiliate operations and
simply inflate the price they pay for their own gas. Speech by Ronald G.
Carr, The Antitrust Division Perspective: Mergers and Acquisitions in the
Natural Gas Industry 4, American Gas Association, Arlington, Virginia
(Mar. 31, 1982).
58. In addition pipelines compete with suppliers of alternate fuels for their
direct-sale industrial customers. Where the price of gas approaches the
price of low sulfur No. 6 fuel oil for those customers with fuel switching
capability, large industrial consumers of gas are encouraged to change
suppliers. Policy Statement, supra note 57, at 30,107.
59. Anderson, supra note 53, at 8. See also FERC Order No. 27, Certification
of Pipeline Transportationfor Certain High Priority Uses, 44 Fed. Reg.
24,825 (Apr. 27, 1979) ; FERC Order No. 533, 54 F.P.C. 821 (1975) ; FERC
Order No. 533-A, 54 F.P.C. 2058 (1975). Gas distributors may have similar
concerns. Anderson, supra note 53, at 5.
60. FPC Order No. 433 was affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals in American
Public Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1089 (1978). The court there observed
that because the gas prices of interstate pipelines were regulated under the
Natural Gas Act and because gas purchased by industrial customers directly
from the interstate market was not, end users were better able to compete
with exempt intrastate pipelines for scarce gas suppliers than were the
regulated interstate pipelines.
55.
56.
57.
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age "self-help"
and industrial
pipeline acting
rently remains

arrangements allowing certain commercial
gas users to secure gas directly, with the
solely as a transporter. 1 This policy curin effect. 2

Similarly, gas pipelines may compete for gas supplies
with distribution companies for whom they transport gas. In
deed, section 603 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 197863 encourages gas distributors to develop

gas supplies on Outer Continental Shelf leaseholds, and requires the FERC to promulgate a statement of general policy
concerning the transportation of distributor-owned gas from
an Outer Continental Shelf lease to the distributor's local
service area. FERC Order No. 92,64 which was adopted by
the Commission in response to section 603's directive, permits distributors to seek amendments to pipeline certificates

on behalf of the pipelines. Such amendments would permit
pipelines to transport distributor-owned gas."
Franchise competition and competition for industrial
loads may also occur between pipelines and their distribution customers. In one 1978 dispute before the FERC, the
61.

62.

63.
64.
65.

In early 1978, the FERC in its Order No. 2 (FERC Docket No. RM75-25
(February 1, 1978)) continued the FPC's Order No. 533 program. This
policy was later carried over into section 608 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3173), which
amended section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, to explicitly authorize the
issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity for the transportation of direct sale gas intended for certain high priority uses, 15
U.S.C. § 717f(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
Conversely, gas producers may compete with gas pipelines for access to
distributors and end use customers. See e.g., Woods Exploration and Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971)
(Antitrust action by gas producers charging competing producer-pipeline
company with monopolization by refusing to deal with plaintiffs or to
transport plaintiffs' gas in competition with its own). See also, Anderson,
supra note 53, at 10.
43 U.S.C. § 1862 (1978).
No. RM80-11 (FERC issued July 24, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,247 (July 15,
1980).
The Commission rejected arguments that increasing distributor access to
OCS gas would lead to undesirable competition between pipelines and distributors, noting that Congress had declared such competition to be in the
public interest. Moreover, the Commission observed, competition would
likely lead to increased exploration and production of offshore gas. FERC
Regs. Preambles
30,173, at 31,171 (1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,247 (July 15,
1980). The Laclede Gas Company, a gas distributor, has urged the Commission to extend its policy of encouraging distributor self-help to all gas
sources, not just those located offshore. Its petition for a Commission
rulemaking is currently pending. See Laclede Gas Co., FERC No. RM82-1
(filed Oct. 14, 1981) (hereinafter cited as Petition].
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cities of Winfield and Magnum, Kansas complained that the
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company (ARKLA) was charging
them higher rates for gas than the rates charged to the
pipeline's affiliated distribution companies, in an attempt
to squeeze the municipal systems out of business."0 Another
example of apparent competition for industrial loads appears
from a motion recently filed with the Commission by the
Tennessee Valley Municipal Gas Association." The Association alleges in its motion that the Alabama-Tennessee Gas
Company illegally inserted a provision in its rate filing preventing gas distributors from reselling purchased gas, in
competition with the pipeline, to industrial customers located
beyond their city limits."
Pipeline Bottlenecks
Like transmission access in the electric utility industry, the availability of transportation service over a
gas pipeline may be essential to the feasibility of competition between the owner of that pipeline and end users,
distributors, other pipelines, and even producers. As the
Supreme Court has stated, the Natural Gas Act" was aimed
at "monopolistic forces" controlling natural gas.7 0 The key
to this control is the essential link that the pipeline provides
between customer and producer. Ownership of a pipeline
facility has been held to give a firm monopoly power over
66. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 4 F.E.R.C. 61,318 (1978). The hearing order
initiated procedures similar to those it adopted for establishment of a prima
facie case of "price squeeze" in electric utilities cases. The Commission's
price squeeze procedures, appearing in its statement of policy (18 CFR §
2.17 (1976)) have undergone considerable modification in subsequent caseby-case adjudication. See discussion in FERC No. RM 79-80, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Price Squeeze-Substantive Rules (No. 19, 1979),
44 Fed. Reg. 67,158 (Nov. 23, 1979).
67. The issue raised in that motion is currently pending before the Commission
and is discussed in Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 21 F.E.R.C. 1
61,391 (1982). The author is involved in this case as FERC counsel.
68. Resale restrictions in electric utility cases have been declared by the
FERC to be per se unlawful under the Federal Power Act. Central Maine
61,066 (1978); Louisiana Power & Light Co., 14 F.E.R.C. 61,075 (1981).
See supra note 12. Similar restraints imposed by pipelines have been held
violative of the Natural Gas Act. Florida Gas Transission Co., 47 F.P.C.
341 (1972); Humble Gas Transmission Co., 37 F.P.C. 920 (1967), aff'd,
Missisippi Valley Gas Co. v. FPC, 398 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1968); Southern
Natural Gas Co., 25 F.P.C. 925 (1961), and have been the subject of
federal antitrust investigations as well.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717(z) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
70. FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 397-98 (1974).
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gas produced from a single field."' Congress has recognized
the bottleneck nature of gas pipelines. Discussions in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives on Amendments
to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act" indicate that
sections 5(e) and 5(f) 7 of the Act were intended to prevent inter alia "bottleneck monopolies and other anticompetitive situations involving pipelines."" Of equal significance is the fact that the Commission's own certification
authority 5 places practical limits upon the number of pipelines that are permitted to serve a given market."' The limitation on transportation alternatives available to producers
moreover may give individual pipelines monopsony power
over those producers."
71. Woods Exploration .& Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d
at 1304 (5th Cir. 1971). There the court held that a single gas field was
an identifiable relevant geographic market and that defendant's control
over transportation gave it monopoly power. Id. at 1307. In an unpublished
study, FERC economist David Mead notes that while in a number of areas
gas producers enjoy a moderate amount of competition among pipelines
vying for the right to transport gas from producing areas, outside of major
producing states, receiving capacity concentration is extremely high, i.e.,
pipelines or distributors receiving gas from other pipelines have few choices.
D. Mead. Concentration in the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry 23-25 (August, 1981) (unpublished study) (emphasis added). Two earlier studies
of the monopsony power held by gas pipelines reached similar conclusions:
MACAVOY, PRICE FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS: A STUDY OF COMPETITION, MONOPSONY, AND REGULATION (1962); Braeutingam, The Deregulation of Nationl Gas, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND

REFORM 142 (1981).
72. 43 U.S.C. 6§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Suup. IV 1980).
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(e) and (f) (1978).
74. See H. CON. REP. No. 1474 (1978). 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 47. The House discusion of section 1334 in the Conference Committee bill similarly indicates
concern that "bottleneck monopolies" would not prevent open and nondiscriminatory access. 124 CONG. REC. H8880 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1978)
(remarks by Rep. Sieberling).
75. Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act grants the Commission authority to issue
certificates of public convenience and necessity to applicants seeking authority to construct and operate gas pipeline facilities in interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 717(f) (1976).
76. This authority has been exercised to insure that transportation facilities
will achieve scale economies and will not result in duplication of facilities.
High Island Offshore Systems is a case in point. By its order certificating
the High Island Offshore Systems (HIOS) facility the Commission assured that gas produced in the HIOS vicinity would be transported solely
over that line. High Island Offshore System, 55 F.P.C. 2674 (1976).
77. Anderson, supra note 53, at 10-11. Mr. Anderson discusses the circumstance in which a producer has but one pipeline with which it can connect:
In such instances, the pipeline may have an unfair bargaining
advantage and offers only a low price and other unfavorable
contract terms. Alternatively, he may simply refuse to buy gas
at all in an attempt to keep gas in the ground and thus available
for the future when the pipeline will have a greater need. In the
jargon of economics, the pipeline has monopsony power over the
producer. Id.
Laclede Gas Company complains, for example, that on one occasion,
it could arrange to secure the transportation and storage of gas, which it
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How BIG AN ISSUE?

For smaller electric utility systems, the availability of
access to the transmission networks of larger vertically
integrated systems has long been recognized as an issue of
some importance. The FPC's 1964 National Power Survey
stated that all generating utilities ought to look "far beyond" their own service areas in planning new sources of
supply" and urged small systems in particular to "recognize the need for obtaining their power supply from low
cost sources," noting that "there must be opportunity for
them to do so.""
As Professor Meeks has observed, these smaller systems, which are for the most part municipal utilities or
rural electric cooperatives, are almost invariably dependent
upon the transmission networks of neighboring utilities for
access to competing suppliers:
Unless the municipality has access to alternative
sources of economical power . . the neighboring
system can virtually control the performance of the
municipal system through its control over the wholesale price of power .... Such control . . . is
probably very common and very effective, primarily
because of the almost universal control over transmission by the dominant selling system in an area."'
Litigation over the rates, terms, and conditions of transmission service, including access, has been brought frequently
before the FERC in recent years.' Many have noted preproduces in Oklahoma to its market in St. Louis, Missouri only by relinquishing two thirds of its annual production to the transporting pipeline
companies. Petition, supra note 65, at 22. See also CIG Exploration Co.,
55 F.P.C. 2384 (1976) (approving agreement under which Montana-Dakota
Utilities Co. agreed to transport gas for Colorado Interstate Gas Co., and
retained option to purchase up to 25% of gas delivered for transportation).
78. FPC, 1964 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY, pt. I, at 3.

79. Id. pt. I, ch. 16, at 267.
80. Meeks, supra note 13, at 78. Dr. William Hughes, of Charles River Associates, has estimated in testimony before the FERC that the nation's 100
largest utilities are likely to have substantial market power. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., No. E-7777 (II) Transcript (Consol. Helms) 34,931.
81. See Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 13 F.E.R.C.
63,036 (1980) (Initial Decision) (wheeling conditions found to unreasonably inhibit formation of new system), complaint withhdrawn and initial
decision vacated as moot, 20 F.E.R.C.
61,406 (Sept. 30, 1982); Buckeye
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viously that the scenarios described in most deregulation
proposals acknowledge transmission access as a vital prerequisite for decontrol of electrical generation. 2 Gas pipeline
access issues, though less thoroughly documented or discussed
than similar issues in the electric utility industry, are nevertheless also issues of unmistakably emerging importance.
The signs are clear. Partial deregulation of natural gas
under the NGPA has brought pressure to bear on state commissions, independent gas producers, distributors, and intrastate pipelines-a number of whom view access to transportation service by interstate pipelines as a means to limit
what they see as the excessive economic power of the interstate pipelines.
The October 26, 1981 issue of the Oil & Gas Journal
reported the formation by the Independent Petroleum Association of America of the Association for Equal Access to
Natural Gas Markets and Supplies.8 This Association, the
Journal states, seeks greater availabiilty to gas producers
of transportation service over intrastate and interstate
pipelines. 4 The Association has argued in comments filed
with the DOE 85 that intrastate pipelines, without access to
the interstate pipeline systems cannot bid on an equal basis
with interstate pipelines for new supplies. 6 Similarly, it
has pointed out that other potential shippers face the same
constraints-independent producers cannot deal freely with
would-be purchasers who may have greater need for the gas.

82.
83.
84.
85.

86.

61,067 (1982)
Power Inc. v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 18 F.E.R.C.
(utility unreasonably limited contract interpretation to exclude customer
from service), appeal pending sub nom., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v.
FERC, No. 82-3338 (6th Cir. 1982); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co,. 11
61,114 (1980) (wheeling tariff found to unreasonably limit
F.E.R.C.
power exchanges and purchases by wheeling customers); Florida Power &
63,014 (1980) (Initial Decision) (utility retained
Light Co., 12 F.E.R.C.
unreasonable arbitrary power to restrict wheeling service), vacated as part
of settlement, 19 F.E.R.C. 61,269 (1982).
See supra notes 43-45.
Common Carrier Role for Gas Pipelines, OIL & GAS J., Oct. 26, 1981, at
70-71.
Id.
Natural Gas Equal Access Ass'n, Informal Comments of the Association
for Equal Access to Gas Markets and Supplies on DOE's Legislative Specifications to Correct the Deficiencies of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
(on file with the author).
Id.
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than the interstate pipeline; as a result, production incentives are reduced and supplies are limited. 7
Gas distributors recently have voiced similar concerns.
The Laclede Gas Company, a gas distributor in the St. Louis
area, has petitioned the FERC for rulemaking which would
require pipelines seeking certificates to transport gas for
distributors as a condition of certification."s
A proposal by Michigan Congressman Dingell that
would obligate pipelines to transport gas purchased by their
distributor-customers within the limits of a pipeline's capacity 9 has received the endorsement of several distributor
spokespersons. For example, a recent article by Russell
Fleming, Jr., and Joseph M. Oliver, Jr., counsel for a number
of distribution companies, that appeared in Public Utilities
Fortnightly,s" takes the position that groups of distributors,
by combining resources, can bargain effectively with major
gas producers. 1 Moreover, the authors contend, while direct
87. Common Carrier Role for Gas Pipelines, supra note 83, at 71. In reviewing
a draft of this article. Professor John Flynn of the University of Utah
School of Law, commented that pipeline mononsony power in a deregulated
market for gas supplies might push indenendent producers to act collectively i.e., fix prices, in order to offset a pipeline's price depressing monopsony advantage. Pointine to In Re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust
Litigation (MDL No. 403 (D.N. Mexico)), he suggested that similar
claims against producers would be likely to arise in the future unless
pipeline access conditions are improved. givincr nroducers purchaser alternatives to the dominant pipeline svstems. Telephone conversq.tion with
Prof. John Flynn, University of Utah School of Law (May 24, 1982).
88. Petition, supra note 65. The Association for Eaual Access to Natural Gas
Markets. mentioned above, has filed comments in support of the petition.
David Mead points out that two-thirds of all gas distributors are served
by only a single pineline, and that. on average, gas distributors are served
by 1.8 pipelines. Mead, supra note 71, at 25.. He concludes that these
concentration indicators suggest the large potential for pipeline monopoly
power to be exercised against distributors, at least in the short run, with
long run fuel substitution possibilities moderating this power somewhat
for industrial users. Id. at 34-35.
Pipeline concentration of the nature described by Mead has prompted
the attention of the Justice Department. particularly in light of rate deregulation. In a March 31, 1982 speech before the American Gas Association, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ronald Carr expressed the Antitrust Division's view that pipeline mergers with producers and distributors
would be carefully scrutinized in light of the pipeline's potential ability to
pass unregulated gas prices on to distributors and the distributors' lack of
alternative sources of supply. Carr, supra note 57.
89. Speech by Representative Dingell, The Decontrol of Natural Gas, Mid-year
meeting of Federal Energy Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 29,
1981) (cited in Fleming and Oliver, The Gas Distributor Approaches Deregulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 2, 1981, at 13).
90. Fleming and Oliver, supra note 89, at 13.
91. Id. at 15.
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distributor-supplier relationships represent a departure from
the "first purchase" function traditionally performed by
pipelines, the change is of modest proportions, consistent
with the gas distributors' need to maintain "retail marketability." 2 The authors state:
In the context of deregulated wellhead prices, where
any price is possible and virtually any price is recoverable by the regulated pipeline, it makes sense
for the gas distributor to take responsibility for
determining whether a given new gas supply is or
is not marketable at the retail level. That role naturally brings the distributor to the bargaining table
with the producer or any other supplier of gas.93
Since 1981, price and supply pressures on gas consumers
in Michigan, Ohio, and Nevada have prompted several filings
against pipeline companies with the FERC. In Northwest
Pipeline Corporation," the Sierra Pacific Power Company,
a gas distributor serving northern Nevada, complained to
the Commission in an intervention petition that Northwest
Pipeline's gas transportation arrangement with Sierra Pacific's wholesale supplier, the Southwest Gas Corporation
(SGC), prohibited SGC from transporting certain Utah gas
to Sierra Pacific." The petition pointed out that SGC purchased gas from Northwest Pipeline at a higher price than
the Utah gas and that Northwest Pipeline did allow SGC to
transport other, more expensive gas to northern Nevada."
The petition to intervene alleging undue discrimination was
withdrawn without explanation" and the transportation
arrangement was thereafter approved.9"
Michigan v. Trunkline Gas Co.," is a complaint proceeding pending before the FERC at the time of this writ92. The authors point out that the Dingell proposal, loosely referred to as a
common carrier alternative, is really only a call for contract carriage obligations consistent with the present statutory scheme. Id. This author
largely shares that view as is explained later in this article.
93. Id.
94. 16 F.E.R.C.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

62,260 (1981).

FERC No. CP78-546-005 (filed July 10, 1981).
Id. at 2.
FERC No. CP78-546-005 (filed Aug. 12, 1981).
62,260 (1981).
16 F.E.R.C.
FERC No. RP81-103-000 (filed Aug. 6, 1981).
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ing. Among other issues, the state of Michigan alleges that
Trunkline's supply contracts with gas distributors in Michigan contain unreasonable take-or-pay provisions which prohibit distributors "from seeking lower priced gas elsewhere."' 0 This, the complaint states, "prevents market realignment that would otherwise occur when high prices are
charged by one pipeline company"-a problem which, it notes,
is exacerbated by gas price decontrol."0 1
In another pending action, the State of Ohio has sought
a declaratory judgment from the FERC that portions of
Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation's system are nonjurisdictional under the Natural Gas Act. The state wishes
to require the pipeline to transport Ohio-produced gas directly
for industrial and distribution customers who have secured
their own supplies. 0 "
The increasing agitation for supply flexibility on the
part of gas consumers is indicative of the growing significance pipeline access issues will have in coming years. Parallel issues arising in the electric utility industry underscore the need for a critical analysis of access standards
under the Gas and Power Acts. The present state of the
law and its limits will largely determine whether the FERC
will have the flexibility to meet these challenges of the 1980's.
Recent Decisions
Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC °3 (FP&L) and
New York State Electric & Gas Co. v. FERC °4 (NYSEG),
decisions recently handed down by the Fifth and Second Circuits respectively, both address the breadth of FERC authority to regulate transmission, or wheeling arrangements'1 5
100. Id. at 4. This complaint was recently set for hearing by the Commission.
Michigan v. Trunkline Gas Co., 20 F.E.R.C.
61,100 (1982). The author
has been assigned to this case.
101. Id.
102. State of Ohio, FERC No. CP82-202-002 (filed Feb. 10, 1982).
103. 660 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981).
104. 638 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 105 (1981).
105. The Supreme Court has defined "wheeling" as the "transfer by direct
transmission or displacement [of] electric power from one utility to another
over the facility of an intermediate utility." Otter Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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between public utilities and their customer-competitors. In
each case, actions by the agency to rectify what it perceived
as competitive abuses by the utility or to enhance competitive opportunities for the utility's customers were struck
down by the courts. The court's decisions may potentially
affect not only FERC regulation of transmission arrangements,"'8 but also its regulation of other electric services.
They may similarly cut across industry lines to restrict
FERC regulatory authority over gas pipeline transportation
under the Natural Gas Act."0 7

The factual background of the NYSEG decision is relatively uncomplicated. On May 25, 1978, the village of Penn
Yan, New York filed a complaint with the FERC alleging
that the wheeling contract between Penn Yan's power supplier, the Power Authority of the State of New York
(PASNY) and NYSEG, the wheeling party, was anticompetitive and in violation of the Federal Power Act.0 8 In
particular, Penn Yan objected to a provision in the contract
between NYSEG and PASNY which limited power wheeled
by NYSEG to the territorial boundaries of Penn Yan and
other PASNY customers as those boundaries were defined in
1961.19 In 1967 Penn Yan had annexed the community of
Excell Estates whose residents were served by NYSEG.
106. Arguably both decisions are limited to electric transmission cases. They do
not purport to deal with other areas of FERC authority. The rationale
underlying both decisions however, cannot logically be confined to that
limited class of transmission cases. See infra text accompanying notes 21334.
107. The parallel structures of the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and Federal Power
Act (FPA) compel similar statutory constructions. Provisions of the FPA
are to be read in pari materia with analogous provisions of the NGA. FPC
v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353 (1956). The "unusual similarity" between the two acts is discussed at some length in City of Gainesville v. Florida Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1277-78 (S.D. Fla.
1980). As discussed below, the implications of NYSEG and FP&L for gas
regulation are significant. An interesting side effect is the awkward position in which these cases may put certain combination electric and gas
utilities. Electric utilities that also operate gas distribution systems may
find themselves arguing for stringent limits on the Commission's authority
to modify wheeling arrangements, while simultaneously urging the Commission to broaden their access to gas supplies by expanding the availability of transportation service from gas pipelines.
108. Village of Penn Yan v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 6 F.E.R.C.
61,283 at 61,668 (1979).
109. Id. at 61,667; New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d at 391
(1980). A similar provision was contained in the contract entered into
between NYSEG and Penn Yan in 1962 when Penn Yan switched wholesale suppliers from NYSEG to PASNY. Id.
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Twice, in 1970 and again in 1978, NYSEG turned down
Penn Yan's requests to allow the village to serve those customers, each time invoking the limitations in its contracts
with the village and with PASNY. 11°
The Commission agreed with Penn Yan's assertions as
to the anticompetitive effects of the PASNY-NYSEG contract, noting that NYSEG had justified the challenged restriction as "specifically designed to reserve the territorial
integrity of the company's franchise area as of February
10, 1961."' 1 1 Ruling that the contract between PASNY and
NYSEG required NYSEG to wheel any additional power
required to meet Penn Yan's retail load increases occurring
within the village's 1961 borders, the Commission concluded
that the contract provision unreasonably limited the use of
wheeled power:
It is only when Penn Yan attempts to utilize
wheeled PASNY power to serve outside those boundaries that the restriction comes into play. The
effect of those provisions, then is to protect NYSEG
from competition for retail customers and to restrict Penn Yan's ability to extend its municipal
system, thereby impairing and diminishing competition to serve retail customers in the extended territories."'
The Commission ordered the provision deleted" 3 and
NYSEG appealed, arguing that its contract with PASNY
was not subject to FERC jurisdiction. In addition, NYSEG
claimed, even if the contract had to be filed with the Commission, FERC had no authority to impose the relief ordered
absent appropriate findings made pursuant to provisions of
the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
("PURPA") which granted the Commission certain authority over wheeling arrangements.' 14
110. Village of Penn Yan v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 6 F.E.R.C. at
61,667 (1979).
111. Id. at 61,670.
112. Id. at 61,669 (footnote omitted).
113. Id. at 61,670.
114. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). PURPA amended the Federal
Power Act. Under new FPA sections 211 and 212 the Commission may
require wheeling, including the expansion of existing transmission facilities
under certain specified conditions.
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The Second Circuit rejected NYSEG's argument regarding the Commission's jurisdiction," 5 but agreed with
the utility that the Commission had compelled wheeling and
thereby had exceeded its authority under section 206 of the
Act."' Relying upon the legislative history of the Act, which
the court stated revealed Congressional refusal to grant the
Commission broad powers to compel wheeling in the public
interest, the court concluded that the Commission's powers
to regulation transmission contracts pursuant to section 206
of the Act did not permit the Commission to expand a utility's
115. 638 F.2d at 398.
116. The Court's conclusion on the basis of its own "factual analysis" (638 F.2d
at 401) is open to some question. The Commission had determined that its
order did not expand NYSEG's wheeling obligation, but merely removed a
limitation on the use of wheeled power. As the Commission explained in
its order, had the village's new customers been located within the village's
1961 borders, NYSEG would have been obligated under the contract to
provide the full power requirements of those additional customers. Village
of Penn Yan v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 6 F.E.R.C. at 61,668-69
(1979). Physically, the power supplied to Excell Estates would not be
wheeled by NYSEG; the utility would simply transmit the power to Penn
Yan's point of delivery. It would then be distributed by Penn Yan to all
points on its distribution system including Excell Estates. The nature of
the NYSEG contract restriction is perhaps best characterized, as it was
by the Commission, as a form of resale restriction. Id. at 61,669. Viewed
this way, the contract restriction is no different from a provision which
would permit Penn Yan to receive PASNY power unless that power were
resold to industrial customers. Commission rejection of comparable resale
limitations on the power sold by a utility has been sustained by the courts.
Georgia Power Co., 35 F.P.C. 436 (1966), afI'd sub. nom., Georgia Power
Co. v. FPC, 373 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1967).
The court's unexplained reluctance to defer to the Commission's factual
determination in lieu of its own "factual analysis" as to what constitutes
"additional wheeling" is in marked contrast to its subsequent decision in
City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.
1981). There the court adopted the Commission's definition of electric
utility competition, finding the FERC's definition "persuasive both on its
face and in light of the Commission's expertise with respect to the electric
industry. .. ." Id. at 930. The dissent by district judge Goettel (sitting by
designation) in New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. concluded that any
additional wheeling would have been de minimus. 688 F.2d at 403.
One other point is worthy of note. The court also found inappropriate
the Commission's failure to hold a hearing to determine the reasonableness
of the restriction. The Court acknowledged that the avowed purpose behind
the restriction was anti-competitive, but that a public interest against the
duplication of facilities might be vindicated at a hearing. 638 F.2d at 399400.
The Commission had considered the question of duplicate retail distribution facilities, but concluded that the reasonableness of the clause did
not depend upon this factor; the decision as to service area would be left
to the state commission. Village of Penn Yan v. New York State Elec. &
Gas Corp., 6 F.E.R.C. at 61,670 n.11 (1979). In rejecting the Commission's
rationale, the court appears to have overlooked the principle that private
contracts in restraint of competition cannot be justified on the ground that
they merely enforce existing state law. See City of Huntingburg v. FPC,
498 F.2d 778, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ; City of Groton v. Connecticut Light
and Power Co., 456 F. Supp. 360, 370 (D. Conn. 1978).
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commitment to wheel."' Moreover, the Court noted, while
the Commission's new power to order wheeling under PURPA
"was undoubtedly intended, at least in part, to serve as a
tool for enhancing competition by facilitating bulk purchases
of power,' '11 the stringent requirements imposed upon any
wheeling order strongly suggested that Congress intended
to "safeguard the voluntariness of wheeling arrangements
to the greatest extent possible while providing 'assurance to
all persons that they will be treated fairly and compensated
fully' if they are compelled to provide involuntary services.""' Finally, the court observed, its ruling would not
117. 638 F.2d at 401.
118. Id. at 402.
119. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 496 (IV) (July 19, 1977) at 152; 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG & AD. NEWS 8595).
It is unclear whether the court was relying upon the legislative history
of PURPA merely to aid in its construction of section 206 or whether the
court was holding that the passage of PURPA itself limited the Commission's preexisting authority under section 206. To the extent that the
court's ruling suggests the latter, it is of dubious validity. Repeals by
implication are disfavored. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S.
659 (1975); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). Moreover, section
4 of PURPA provides:
Section 4, Relationship to Antitrust Laws:
Nothing in this Act or in any amendment made by the Act
affects(1) the applicability of the antitrust laws to any electric utility
or gas utility . . . or
(2) any authority of the Secretary [of Energy] or of the [Federal Energy Regulatory] Commission under any other provision of
law (including the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act)
respecting unfair methods of competition or anticompetitive acts
or practices.
In explaining the above provision, the House and Senate conferences stated
their intent that the provisions of PURPA: "be strictly neutral and not
add or subtract from the immunities and defenses available under such
laws nor add or subtract from authorities contained in such laws." H.R.
REP. No. 95-1750, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 68 (1978), S. REP. No. 1292, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 68 (1978) (emphasis added).
On October 9, 1978 the full Senate took up the conference report. Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio, discussing the relationship between Sections 203 and 204 of PURPA and the Commission's preexisting authority
over transmission service, reiterated that the latter was not affected by
the former, as indicated in the following passage:
It was not the intent of the conferees to modify in any way the
rights of parties in presenting a [sic] prosecuting allegations of
anticompetitive conduct before the Federal and State Courts, or
before administrative agencies, including the FERC and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Both have legal obligations to consider antitrust issues. Where any of these agencies have the authority to order transmission, coordination or other relief pursuant to a finding of anticompetitive conduct, undue discrimination or unjust and unreasonable rates, terms, conditions or the
like, this authority would not be disturbed. The act does not limit
the present authority to these agencies in this regard. Thus, a
party which has been denied wheeling service for anticompetitive
reasons will not be hindered by this legislation from proceeding
in the Federal courts or elsewhere.
124 Co o. Rac. 34764 (1978).
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prevent the Commission from modifying unlawful transmission rates or practices under section 206, provided that the
modification does not amount to an order compelling
wheeling. 120
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC,2 ' the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion. There,
the court struck down a Commission order directing Florida
Power & Light Company ("FP&L") to make certain filings
regarding its transmission rates and the terms under which
it would provide transmission service. Specifically, the Commission had directed FP&L to file a tariff'12 in substitution
for eighteen nearly identical but separate transmission service schedules it had previously submitted to the Commission.
In addition, granting an earlier motion filed by its staff,'
the Commission directed FP&L to include as part of its tariff
the four criteria governing FP&L transmission availability
which one of its employees, Mr. Ernest Bivans, had articuwith the Comlated in prepared written testimony 1 24 filed
2 5
ER77-175.
No.
mission in FERC Docket
120. The court held that where modification of the transmission arrangement
amounts to an "expansion" of the wheeling obligation, relief cannot be
ordered by the Commission except under the provisions of Sections 211 and
212 of the FPA that were added by PURPA. The difficulty inherent in
this formulation and its consistency with the court's view that the 1935
Act was intended to provide effective federal regulation of the expanding
business of transmitting and selling electric power interstate" ((638 F.2d
at 393) (emphasis added)) is discussed at some length, infra at notes 188234 and accompanying text.
121. 660 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981).
122. The Commission defines "tariff" under its regulations as follows:
The term 'tariff' means a compilation, in book form, of rate
schedules of a particular public utility, effective under the Federal
Power Act, and a copy of each form of service agreement. In
connection herewith, attention is invited to Part 154 of this chapter, i.e., the Commission's regulations under the Natural Gas Act,
as a guide to the form and composition of a tariff.
18 C.F.R. § 35.2(b) n.1 (1979).
123. 660 F.2d at 669-70.
124. Mr. Bivans had testiifed that FP&L was willing to provide transmission
service when:
1. The specific potential seller and buyer are contractually identified;
2. The magnitude, time and duration of the transaction are specified prior to the commencement of the transmission;
3. It can be determined that the transmission capacity will be
available for the term of the contract; and
4. The rate for such service is sufficient to compensate FP&L
for its costs.
660 F.2d at 671.
125. Id. at 670-71.
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Reasoning that FP&L had intended for the Commission
to rely on Mr. Bivans' sworn statements in adjudging the
lawfulness of its rates in that proceeding, the Commission
concluded that such statements represented an articulation
of company policy. The Commission held that pursuant to
section 205 (c) of the Federal Power Act,12 as well as the
corresponding provisions of the Commission's regulations,'27
the transmission criteria articulated by the witness should
be included in the company's transmission rate schedules
as "practices" affecting those rates.'28 In addition, the Com126. Section 205(c) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d provides:
(c) Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe, every public utility shall file with the Commission,
within such time and in such form as the Commission may designate, and shall keep open in convenient form and place for public
inspection schedules showing all rates and charges for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and
the classification, practices, and regulations affecting such rates
and charges, together with all contracts which in any manner
affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and services.
127. 18 C.F.R. §§ 35.1-35.2 (1981).
Section 35.1 provides in relevant part:
(a) Every public utility shall file with the Commission . . .
full and complete rate schedules, . . . clearly and specifically set-

ting forth all rates and charges for any transmission or sale of
electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission, the
classifications, practices, rules and regulations affecting such
rates and charges and all contracts which in any manner affect
or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, services, rules,
regulations or practices, as required by section 205(c) of the
Federal Power Act (49 Stat. 851; 16 U.S.C. 824d(c)) ....
Section 35.2 reads as follows:
(a) Electric service. The term "electric service" as used
herein shall mean the transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce or the sale of electric energy at wholesale for resale in
interstate commerce, and may be comprised of various classes of
capacity and energy sales and/or transmission services. "Electric
service" shall include the utilization of facilities owned or operated
by any public utility to effect any of the foregoing sales or services
whether by leasing or other arrangements. As defined herein,
"electric service" is without regard to the form of payment or
compensation for the sales or services rendered whether by purchase and sale, interchange, exchange, wheeling charge, facilities
charge, rental or otherwise.
(b) Rate schedule. The term "rate schedule" as used herein
shall mean a statement of (1) electric service as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, (2) rates and charges for or in connection with that service, and (3) all classifications, practices, rules,
regulations or contracts which in any manner affect or relate to
the aforementioned service, rates, and charges. This statement
shall be in writing and may take the physical form of a contractual document, purchase or sale agreement, lease of factilities,
tariff or other writing. Any oral agreement or understanding
forming a part of such statement shall be reduced to writing and
made a part thereof.
See, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 34 F.P.C. 621, 626 (1965)
(interpreting parallel NGA regulation 18 C.F.R. § 154.38(b) (1980).
128. Florida Power & Light Co., No. ER78-19 (FERC Order issued Dec. 21,
1979), slip op. at 4-6.
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mission noted that incorporation of these criteria into existing
schedules not only would ease administrative burdens, 12' but
would facilitate transmission availability and thus promote
competition.3 Finally, the Commission held that since the
inclusion of FP&L's transmission availability criteria in the
filed tariff did nothing more than set forth the company's
own policy, there would be no expansion of FP&L's transmission obligation and hence no compulsion to wheel. 1 '
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Commission's
arguments that its order would not compel wheeling. Electric utilities, the court reasoned, were not common carriers
under the Federal Power Act,' 3 2 nor had the Commission
made any findings that by adoption of its wheeling policies
33
FP&L had assumed such status as a matter of common law.1
The court found persuasive, moreover, FP&L's contention
that the Commission's order did expand the company's transmission obligation:
We agree with FP&L that the Commission's order
does in effect impose common carrier status upon
FP&L. While the tariff is on file, FP&L would be
obligated to provide the tariff service to all customers. In a significant sense, its duties and liabilities have changed. Although FP&L had a policy
regarding the availability of wheeling, FP&L, nevertheless, negotiated interchange transmission serv129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id. at 6. The Commission did note however that it was reserving for later
consideration any decision regarding the reasonableness of FP&L's availability policy. Id. at 5.
132. 660 F.2d at 672-3.
133. Id. at 674. The court's implicit but unstated assumption here appears to
be that an electric utility might assume common carrier status by its actions, thus imposing upon itself the obligations of a common carrier at
common law. Where the regulatory agency specifically regulates entities
as common carriers, a finding of common carrier status is requisite to the
very exercise of jurisdiction. See Semon v. Royal Indem. Co., 279 F.2d 737
(5th Cir. 1960). Since, by the court's reasoning electric utilities are not
common carriers, the FERC's jurisdiction does not hinge upon the utility's
common law status. However, the Commission's authority over rates and
practices permits it to enforce common carrier regulations imposed by
other statutes. See Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. FPC, 169 F.2d 392
(8th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 853 (1948) (common carrier obligations imposed upon gas pipeline by Mineral Leasing Act enforceable
under Natural Gas Act). This authority would logically extend to cases
where common carrier status was voluntarily assumed or where it was
imposed by a court (as an antitrust remedy, for example).
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ice agreements on an individual basis with each
municipal utility when approached. There is no
indication in the record that FP&L has voluntarily
agreed to become a common carrier. There is no
indication that FP&L has voluntarily agreed that
any change in the terms of its policy, or any interpretation thereof, should be submitted to the Commission for its approval. The imposition of common
carrier status on FP&L, which the orders at issue
accomplish, is precisely the authority which the
FPA denies the Commission. The legislative history of the FPA makes clear that the Commission
lacks the authority to require electric utilities to
provide wheeling even on a reasonable request. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission lacked
statutory authority to issue the orders in question."'
The Common Carrier and the Private Carrier Under the
Gas and Power Acts
The invalidity of the FERC's orders in the NYSEG and
FP&L cases turns upon determinations by the courts in both
instances that the Commission had attempted to regulate
beyond its authority. In particular, the courts found that
the Commission impermissibly sought to impose common
carrier duties upon electric utilities. These decisions are
troubling both for their potential impact upon FERC authority to regulate anticompetitive, discriminatory or otherwise unreasonable practices, and for their failure to draw
workable distinctions between permissible regulation and the
imposition of common carrier status. Examination of the
concepts of common and private carriage, both at common
134. 660 F.2d at 676 (footnote omitted). In addition, the court rejected the
Commission's argument that its interpretation of "practice" under its own
regulations was entitled to deference by the court pursuant to the court's
ruling in ECEE v. FERC, 611 F.2d 554, 563 (5th Cir. 1980). The court
acknowledged that pursuant to the Commission's long standing interpretation of the Natural Gas Act, a policy of availability had been held to be a
"practice" subject to filing requirements comparable to those imposed upon
electric utilities under the FPA. 660 F.2d at 677. However, it held "[i]n
the context of wheeling, the FPA's legislative history is a compelling reason why we may not defer to the Commission's interpretation." Id. To the
extent that the court would draw a distinction between wheeling and all
other availability provisions under the NGA and FPA, its reasoning rests
on the erroneous assumption that Congress intended to treat transmission
differently from all other services governed by the two statutes. See
infra notes 201-234 and accompanying text. Absent such a distinction, the
Commission's filing requirements under the NGA are vulnerable to challenges similar to those raised by FP&L.
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law and pursuant to statute, will help illustrate the inherent
difficulties and inadequacies in the courts' analyses.
The fundamental characteristic of the common carrier
at common law, as explained by the Fifth Circuit in FP&L,
is its undertaking "to carry for all people indifferently."1' 5
By holding itself out to serve the public at large it is considered to take on a "quasi-public character" and a greater
duty of care to its customers.""'
Statutory control over common carriers in the nature
of price and service regulation had its advent in this country
in the late 1800's. In Munn v. Illinois'"the Supreme Court
upheld a state law regulating the charges of grain elevator
operators, ruling that grain storage was a business "affected
with a public interest." With passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887,113 Congress brought the nation's railroad
systems under a detailed scheme of federal regulation. Early
interpretations of the Constitutional basis for common carrier regulation by the states, now discredited, rested upon
the assumption, articulated by the Supreme Court in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,1 9 that the validity of state regulation lay with the monopolistic or public utility nature of
the business being regulated. 4 e In the federal sphere, the
premise for regulation was broad from the beginning. Common carrier regulation has been applied to motor carriers, 4 1
airlines, 4 and communications industries 4 ' - businesses
which were either unknown to the common law, or in the
135. 660 F.2d 674; See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,
525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Semon v. Royal Indem. Co.,
279 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1960); Home Ins. Co. v. Riddell, 252 F.2d 1, 3
(5th Cir. 1958).
136. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d at 640 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
137. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
138. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1887).
139. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
140. Nebbia v. New York put this notion to rest. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). There
the Court upheld state regulation of milk prices as a valid exercise of
state authority, concluding that "'affected with a public interest' is the
equivalent of 'subject to the exercise of the police power'." Id. at 533. The
Court in Nebbia thus implicitly adopted Justice Brandeis' famous dissent
in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.
141. Interstate Commerce Act, Pt. II; Motor Carriers, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327
(1976).
142. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1980),
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cases of motor carriage and air travel, clearly lacking in
monopoly characteristics. The validity of federal regulation
of economic activity is based upon the "well settled principle
that Congress may impose relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the channels of interstate commerce
in order that those channels will not become a means of
promoting or spreading evil, whether of a physical, moral
44
or economic nature.1
A 1976 decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
provides a thoughtful treatment, pertinent to the inquiry
here, of the common carrier concept as applied to the communications industry. National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners v. FCC145 (NARUC) attempts to
draw a distinction between private and common carriers
where the underlying premise for federal regulation is the
common carrier nature of the service being regulated. An
order of the FCC issued in 1975 had exempted certain specialized mobile radio communications systems ("SMRS")
from the common carrier provisions of the Communications
Act, reasoning that the SMRS did not meet the statutory
definition of common carriers contained in the Act. The
court found that the Act did little to define the common carrier and resorted to common law concepts. Based upon these
concepts, however, the court concluded that the Commission
had acted properly in excluding the SMRS carriers. Of particular significance, the court noted, was the nature of a
carrier's undertaking:
Moreover, the characteristic of holding oneself out
to serve indiscriminately appears to be an essential
element, if one is to draw a coherent line between
common and private carriers. The cases make clear
that common carriers need not serve the whole public, and that private carriers may serve a significant clientele, apart from the carrier himself. Since
given private and common carriers may therefore
143. Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §,j 151-609 (1976).
144. North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 687, 750 (1946) (citing Brooks v.
United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1925)). See also, Hope Natural Gas
Co. v. FPC, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
145. 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/1

30

Reiter: Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract C
CONTRACT CARRIER REGULATION

1983

be indistinguishable in terms of the clientele actually served, it is difficult to envision a sensible
line between them which does not turn on the manner and terms by which they approach and deal
with their customers. The common law requirement of holding oneself out to serve the public indiscriminately draws such a logical and sensible
line between the two types of carriers.14
The court's "logical and sensible line" is a useful means
of ascertaining those carriers covered by applicable common
carrier regulation. Yet it is essential to recognize the limits
of the court's holding, which draws a distinction solely between exempt and regulated carriers. The determination of
common or private carrier status thus was critical to the
agency's authority under the governing statute to regulate altogether." '
An understandable but inherently dangerous confusion
exists in the FP&L and NYSEG decisions between the permissible scope of private carrier regulation on the one hand,
and the exemption of private carriers from common carrier
regulation on the other. The Second and Fifth Circuits are
correct in their conclusions that Congress rejected proposals
which would have imposed common carrier status on electric utilities. 148 Congress also rejected similar proposals to
146. Id. at 642 (footnotes omitted).
147. This is the similar import of cases arising under the Interstate Commerce
Act. See, e.g., Semon v. Royal Indem. Co., 279 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1960).
(Status as private or common carrier critical since different statutory
provisions applied to contract versus common carriers.); Home Ins. Co. v.
Riddell, 252 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1958) (Carrier found to be contract, not
common carrier, hence exempt from statute applicable to interstate common
carriers).
148. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973).
The FP&L and NYSEG decisions focus solely upon the common carrier
issue as it relates to transmission. They rely for their conclusions upon
those passages from Section 202(a) of the original House version of the
Federal Power Act which would have imposed upon electric utilities a duty
to transmit for any person upon reasonable request. These are the identical passages cited by the Supreme Court in Otter Tail Power Co., and by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Richmond Power &
Light Co. v. FERCo 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The full provision
however, would have imposed an obligation not only to transmit for others
upon reasonable request, but to sell or exchange power as well:
202(a) It shall be the duty of every public utility to furnish
energy to, exchange energy With and transmit energy for any
person upon reasonable request therefor; and to furnish and maintain such services as shall promote the safety, comfort and con-
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regulate the natural gas industry.'" Instead, Congress enacted statutes which gave the Commission broad regulatory
power over the interstate sale and transmission of electric
power and natural gas, 1 0 but which recognized the need for
"individualized arrangements . . . established initially by
contract ...
.
Court decisions touching upon the scope of Commission
jurisdiction under the NGA and FPA do little to clarify the
distinction between common carrier regulation and the contract carrier regulatory schemes under which the FERC
operates. The Supreme Court in United Gas Pipeline v.
Mobile Gas Corp.' noted, for example, the "marked contrast" between the Natural Gas Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, apparently arising out of "the differing nature
of the industries which gave rise to it [the Natural Gas
Act].'. Hence, the Court emphasized, the impossibility of
policing the vast number of railroad carrier transactions
explained the need for uniform tariffs under the ICA and
the consequent lack of contract filing requirements such as
those imposed upon gas pipelines. On the other hand, the
NGA has been described by the Court as a "far more comprehensive Act" than the ICA insofar as it regulates common
15
carrier oil pipelines.
venience of all its customers, employees, and the public, and shall
in all respects adequate, efficient and reasonable.
H.R. 5423, S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
Thus, applying the rationale expressed in these various court opinions,
Congress rejected common carrier obligations for utilities both with respect
to transmission and sales for resale. As discussed at note 221 and the
accompanying text below, the extension of the FP&L and NYSEG holdings
to the area of wholesaling would have substantial ramifications.
The February 6, 1935 draft of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
submitted by Congressman Rayburn, and later revised by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee (June 22, 1935), H.R. 5423, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., contained a similar common carrier provision for gas pipelines. See infra notes 215-16.
See Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973); FPC v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 471 (1950); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,
390 U.S. 747 (1968).
United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 339 (1956). In a case
decided the same day, the Court held that analogous provisions of the
Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts were to be read in para materia.
Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. FPC, 350 U.S. 348, 350 (1956).
350 U.S. 332 (1956).
Id. at 338.
FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 469 n.9 (1950). See also Farmers
Union Central Exch. v. FERC, 584 F2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied
sub nor., Williams Pipe Line Co.-v. FERC, 439 U.S. 995 (1978).
-- be

149.

150.
151.

152.
153.
154.
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The Fourth Circuit's observation that the Federal Power
Act, "is closely modeled on the Interstate Commerce Act," 15s
further muddles the distinction between common carrier
regulation and the FPA. Conventional rules of statutory construction would require similar interpretation and
To add to the confusion,
application of parallel provisions.'
the Natural Gas Act's provisions have been described as
"regulation along recognized and more or less standardized
7
lines" of a public utility nature.1
Reference to private carrier regulation of other businesses is of little assistance, other than to confirm the permissible breadth and scope of private carrier regulation.
Like the NGA and FPA, many statutes regulating traditionally private carriers were enacted in the 1920's and
1930's. For the most part, however, these statutes were intended to limit the entry into commerce of private carriers
and to regulate their minimum charges.1 58 Regulation of
private motor carriers at the state and federal level was primarily aimed at protecting the business of common carriers
by assuring that private carriers would not undercut the
regulated common carriers in their more profitable areas of
155. St. Michaels Utilities Comm'n v. FPC, 377 F.2d 912, 915 (4th Cir. 1967).
The NGA closely follows the Federal Power Act's provisions. Sierra
Pac. Power Co. v. FPC, 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
156. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Northcross v.
Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973). This is particularly true
where the relevant statutory phrase has been developed over a long history
of government regulation. ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945) (interpretation of the phrase "public convenience and necessity").
157.

H.R. REP. 709, H.R. 6586, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. REc., S. 9316 (Aug.

19, 1937); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); City of
Gainesville v. Florida Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1277-78 (S.D.
Fla. 1980).
The dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson in Hope makes the same
observation, noting that "while not a conventional common-carrier undertaking" the business of a natural gas pipeline company "is essentially a
transportation enterprise consisting of conveying gas from where it is
produced to point of delivery to the buyer. This is a relatively routine
operation not differing substantially from many other utility operations."
320 U.S. at 647. Such descriptions further cloud distinctions one may
attempt to draw since public utility regulation is a form of common carrier
regulation at common law under the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1877).
158. This was characteristic of a number of state statutes regulating private
motor carriers. ICC v. J-T. Transp. Co., Inc., 368 U.S. 81, 95 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter).

See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95

,

§§ 18-301, 18-302, 18-501, 18-506 (1980); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S.
251, 274 (1932); Baker v. Glenn, 2 F. Supp. 880, 882 (E.D. Ky. 1933);
Anderson v. Thomas, 26 P.2d 60, 68 (Or. 1933); State v. Grimshaw, 53
P.2d 13, 15 (Wyo. 1935).
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service. 5 ' Price competition from private carriers, it was
often viewed, could threaten the overall stability of common
carrier service to the public at large. 101
The numerous constitutional challenges to state regulation of contract or private carriers were generally unsuccessful."' The did help firmly establish, however, that private carrier regulation, if based upon a valid state purpose,
could be coextensive with regulation of comomn carriers.""
The broadest statement of this principle is found in the
Supreme Court's decision in Stephenson v. Binford. l3 There

the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Texas statute
regulating private motor carriers as a valid exercise of the
state's power to control use of its highways, stating:
It is difficult to see how the Legislature could
more clearly have evinced an intention to avoid an
attempt to convert the contract carrier into a common carrier. It is true that the regulationsimposed
by the two classes are in some instances similar if
not identical; but they are imposed upon each class
considered by itself, and it does not follow that regulations appropriatelyimposed upon the business of
159. This was the motivation behind passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.
49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976) (currently referred to as the Interstate Commerce Act, Part II; Motor Carriers). As the Supreme Court explained,
the Act was passed at a time when:
The industry was unstable economically, dominated by ease of
competitive entry and a fluid rate picture. And as a result, it
became overcrowded with small economic units which proved to
be unable to satisfy even the most minimal standards of safety or
financial responsibility. So Congress felt compelled to require authorization for all interstate operations to preserve the motor carrier system from overcompetition .
ICC v. J-T Transp., 368 U.S. 81, 94-95 (1961) (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1953)).
In particular, the common carrier, with more extensive regulations and
with greater obligations to the public at large, was to be afforded protection against significant encroachment on its business by the private carrier. ICC v. J-T Transp., 368 U.S. at 95-98 (1961).
160. Id.
161. Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n was a Supreme Court decision
striking down a California statute regulating private carriers on grounds
that the state had failed to articulate a basis for regulation distinct from
the justification for common carrier regulation, is an anomaly. 271 U.S.
583 (1926). Its vitality was severly eroded by the Court's subsequent
decisions in Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932), and Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
162. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932). See Note, State Regulation of
Contract Motor Carriers,33 COLUM. L. REv. 156 (1933).
163. 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
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a common carrier,may not also be appropriate to
the business of a contract carrier.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Champlin Refining Co.
v. United States,'6 5 provides similar support for broad, if
not virtually identical, federal regulation of both private and
common carriers. Champlin, a company engaged in the
business of oil refining, owned and operated its own pipelines extending from the firm's refinery in Kansas to various points of distribution in the states of Kansas, Nebraska,
South Dakota and Iowa. In 1944, the ICC had ordered
Champlin to file various data concerning the operation of
its pipelines. Champlin challenged the order, urging that
since it carried exclusively its own oil, it was not an interstate pipeline subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. 6 ' A
contrary interpretation, Champlin contended, would exceed
the commerce power of Congress and violate Champlin's
fifth amendment rights by converting "a private pipeline
into a public utility and requir[ing] a private carrier to
become a common carrier."' 67 The Court rejected this contention, upholding the ICC's order as a valid exercise of
power under the commerce clause. Moveover, the Court
did not base its holding upon any distinction between private and common carriers:
But our conclusion rests on no such basis and
affords no such implication. The power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce is not dependent
on the technical common carrier status but is quite
as extensive over a private carrier. This power has
yet been invoked only to the extent of requiring
Champlin to furnish certain information as to facilities being used in interstate marketing of its
164. Id. at 266 (emphasis added). To similar effect are a number of state court
decisions. Morel v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 11 Cal.2d 488, 81 P.2d 144
(1938) (duty not to give undue preference or advantage imposed on contract carrier) ; Anderson v. Thomas, 144 Or. 572, 26 P.2d 60 (1933) (duty
of contract carier not to unduly discriminate against passengers of common
carriers). See also Baker v. Glenn, 2 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Ky. 1933) ; Deppman v. Murray, 5 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Wash. 1934) (authority of state to
regulate companies as private carirers although regulations imposed were
"of the nature of those frequently imposed on common carriers.")
165. 329 U.S. 29 (1946).
166. Id. at 33-34.
167. Id. at 34-35.
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products. The commerce power is adequate to support this requirement whether appellant be concidered a private carrier or a common carrier."' 8
As stated earlier, historic regulation of private carriers,
though potentially and permissibly broad in scope, tended to
have as its primary objective the protection of common carriers and the general public dependent upon the services of
stable and reliable carriers. Federal regulation of electric
power companies and natural gas pipeline companies, by
contrast, had all the trappings of conventional public utility
regulation."0 9 Indeed the Natural Gas and Federal Power
Acts were aimed, in part, at eliminating the gap in regulation left by the inability of state commissions to regulate
the interstate activities of gas and electric companies."
It is the public utility form of these regulatory schemes
which distinguishes the NGA and FPA from other private
carrier regulation and which further serves to cloud the dis168. Id. at 35. The Fifth Circuit's holding in Florida Power & Light Co.
would seem to conflict squarely with the Court's ruling in Champlin. As
the Court noted in Champlin, the I.C.C. "made no order which changes
the appellant's obligations to any other company or person," holding that
Champlin's concerns to the contrary were "premature and hypothetical."
329 U.S. at 35.
169. To be sure, the certification process itself presents an entry barrier shielding existing carriers. The power of the FERC to certify natural gas pipelines pursuant to section 7 of the Act, only upon the requisite showing of
"public convenience and necessity," may protect existing gas pipelines from
the entry of new competitors. The certification of a new pipeline, however,
subjects it to the same regulation as the existing facility. Indeed, certification may be granted precisely because lower rates are anticipated from
the new carrier. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 579. See also Cincinnati
Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC. 389 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
826 (1968); Chatanooga Gas Co. v. East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 35
F.P.C. 917 (1966). Alfred Kahn, in his noted work The Economics of
Regulation, observes this distinction between federal regulation of gas pipelines and electric utilities and other contract carrier legislation:
Since these extensions of regulation [electric power and transmission and gas pipeline transportation] were clearly necessary to
close off newly developed avenues for the monopolistic exploitation
of consumers, (i.e., large interstate utility systems), their necessity
has not seriously been questioned by impartial observers. For
the same reasons, they are, at least in retrospect, far less controversial than extensions of regulation whose purpose has been to
forestall or to restrict newly emergent competition.
Kahn, supra note 37, at 30, 105-6 (Vol. II).
170. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1961); FPC v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 466-74 (1950) ; Curtis Report, supra note 18,
at 34. The limits of state jurisdiction created what has come to be known
as the "Attelboro gap," taking its name from the Supreme Court's decision
in Public Util. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attelboro Steam and Elec. Co., 273 U.S.
83 (1926). Curtis Report, eupra note 18, at 34.
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tinction between common carriage and contract carriage, as
the latter is envisioned under the FPA and NGA. Nevertheless, workable and practical distinctions can be drawn
between those regulatory schemes.
The FPA and the NGA take as their basic model the
Interstate Commerce Act."" Thus, it is not surprising to
find, inter alia, prohibitions against 1) unreasonable rates,
charges, and classifications;"' 2) prohibitions against undue
preferences or discriminations in rates or services;17 3) rate
schedule filing requirements; 74 and 4) the grant of agency
authority to prescribe systems of accounts and to conduct
inspections of acounts and records.' 75 Comparable construction of similar provisions found in the three acts is wholly
consonant with sound rules of statutory construction favoring consistent interpretations."" More importantly, adherence to those rules and recognition of distinctions between
common and contract carriers need not lead to conflicting
results.
In a very real sense, the common carrier duty under the
statute imposing it is nearly absolute;17 prior resort to
administrative proceedings is not required of a customer
Section 1(4)
seeking to enforce the carrier's obligations.'
171. See FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353 (1956); St. Michaels
Utilities Comm'n v. FPC, 377 F.2d 912, 915 (4th Cir. 1967).
172. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 10702(b) (Supp. IV 1980); 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (Supp.
IV 1980); 49 U.S.C. § 10726 (Supp. IV 1980); 49 U.S.C. §§ 10324 and
10761 (Supp. IV 1980) with 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1976), 16 U.S.C. § 824e
(1976) and 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 717e (1976). (The
cited provisions of the ICA are applicable solely to oil pipelines). The
Interstate Commerce Act as applied to other carriers has been recodified.
See infra note 179.
173. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (Supp. IV 1980) with 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b)
(1976) and 15 U.S.C. § 717d(b) (1976).
174. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (Supp. IV 1980) and 10761 (Supp. IV 1980)
with 16 U.S.C. § 825e(b) (1976) and 15 U.S.C. § 717d(c) (1976).
175. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 11145 (Supp. IV 1980) with 16 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1976)
and 15 U.S.C. § 717g (1976).
176. Cf. United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932);
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Ridgeway, 291 F.2d 257
(3rd Cir. 1961). This is to be distinguished from cases where broad statutory terms such as "public interest" have been held to take their content
from the basic statutory scheme there involved--e.g., public interest references in a regulatory statute are not an open invitation to examine civil
rights questions. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976). Here the
statutory schemes are similar; they are regulatory in nature.
177. Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969).
178. Id. at 302-03; Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sonman Coal Co., 242 U.S. 120, 125-26
(1916). The courts in both Denver Petroleum Corp. and Pennsylvania R.R.
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of the ICA imposes upon oil pipelines that are common carriers a duty to provide transportation and related services
"on reasonable request. 17. Similar common carrier obligations are found in the Federal Communications Act' s and
the Federal Aviation Act.' It is this duty to provide service upon reasonable request which seems to be declarative
of the common carrier's distinctive duty;18 indeed it is precisely this duty that was embodied in the common carrier
provisions which were originally proposed for inclusion in the
Federal Power and Natural Gas Acts and later rejected. In
virtually all other material respects the bills as originally
proposed remained intact. l8
Within the ICA, the scope of common carrier regulation varies markedly between oil pipelines and all other
common carriers regulated under the Act."' Unlike other
ICA common carriers, oil pipelines are not barred from
carrying their own commodities,8 5 nor are they subject to
the same requirements regarding mergers, corporate affiliations, uniform cost and revenue accounting or issuance of
It is reasonable to conclude that the general
securities.'
duty to serve "upon reasonable request" is the only provi-

179.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

concluded that where the common carrier's obligation to serve on reasonable request under normal conditions is involved, no administrative question
is presented and there is nothing to be passed upon by the agency prior to
judicial action.
49 U.S.C. §§ 10701-10703, 11101 (Supp. IV 1980). Enforcement of ICA
provisions relating to the regulation of oil pipelines is the responsibility
of the FERC which was assigned those former ICC functions upon the
FERC's creation in 1977. See Department of Energy Organization Act,
91 Stat. 581, 584 (1977); 42 U.S.C. § 7155 (Supp. IV 1980); 42 U.S.C. §
7172(b) (Supp. IV 1980); DOE Delegation Order No. 0204-1. In 1978 the
ICA was amended to modernize certain of its terminology and to eliminate
redundancy in its provisions. See Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (1978).
No substantive changes in the law were intended. See Historical and
Revision Notes, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 (1982); H.R. No. 1395, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978). Interestingly, the common carrier provisions, as they applied solely to oil pipelines remain in effect unamended. Pub. L. No. 95-473,
§ 4(c), 92 Stat. 1470 (1978) codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 notes.
47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976).
49 U.S.C. § 1374 (Supp. IV 1980) amended by The Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1704 (1978).
See Lucking v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 265 U.S. 346 (1924).
Compare H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) with the Act as finally
enacted. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824(h), 825-825r (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Farmer's Union Central Exch. v. FERC, 584 F.2d 408, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied sub nom., Williams Pipe Line Co. v FERC, 439 U.S. 995 (1978).
49 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1976) recodified as Pub. L. No. 95-473 (1978), 92 Stat.
1393, 49 U.S.C. § 10746 (1978)
Farmer's Union Central Exch. v. FERC, 584 F.2d at 413 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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sion of the ICA which can accurately be described as uniquely
characteristic of statutory common carriers."i 7
Expansion of the Voluntary Commitment
Commission authority to remove unreasonable restraints
placed upon the customers of regulated pipelines or utilities
or to order elimination of undue preference in rates and
service has engendered little historic debate. Rulings of this
nature, in fact, have been quite common.
The argument that such actions somehow thrust upon
the regulated entity impermissible common carrier duties is
of relatively recent vintage and can probably be traced to
the more frequent interjection of antitrust issues into cases
Past Commission decisions dealt
before the Commission.'
with minor extensions of various wholesale services to new
customers, both gas and electric. For the most part those
decisions did not rest upon considerations of antitrust policy."8 ' None addressed the reasonableness of filed transmission schedules or whether they were unduly discriminatory.
In contrast, cases arising since the early 1970's have focused
more frequently upon the relationship between company and
customer-as-competitor. In this context, issues of group boycott and exclusionary practices by the monopolist, for exsurfaced and have prompted response from the
ample, have
00
agency.
187. The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1) (Supp. IV 1980) and
the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201 (a) (1976), similarly are
modeled upon section 1(4) of the ICA. See also BREYER, supra note 1, at 6.
188. With the rise in oil prices following the Arab oil embargo of 1973, what
had been historically decreasing or modestly increasing cost patterns in the
industry changed drastically. No doubt this has placed greater pressure
on smaller utilities to seek lower cost alternate supply sources. As the
FERC noted in FloridaPower & Light Co., self generation on a small scale
is no longer a viable option and municipal electric systems unable to contain costs are increasingly susceptible to acquisition by their larger competitors at retail. No. ER78-19 (FERC Order issued Aug. 3, 1979), slip
op. at 24, 32 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th 313, 339 (1979).
189. See, e.g., Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 59 F.P.C. 1383 (1977) (extending
electric service to previously excluded systems on grounds of undue
discrimination without addressing competition as an issue) ; Willmut Gas
& Oil Co., 12 F.P.C. 132 (1953); Northern Natural Gas Co., 11 F.P.C. 174
(1952). To date, in fact, the FERC has not addressed the issue of undue
discrimination in any reported case as it relates to third party gas transportation agreements which are offered to some customers but denied to
others.
190. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Agreement, 58 F.P.C. 2622 (1977),
aff'd sub nom., Central Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156 (D.C.
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The injection of competition issues into cases before the
Commission, particularly questions of access to transmission,
has met with considerable resistance from the regulated
utilities.19 ' Their objections to Commission action in this
area have introduced considerable uncertainty into what
had been fairly settled and accepted norms of construction,
at least as applied under the FPA and NGA to rates and
charges.

92

That the reaction of regulated entities to agency actions
which are perceived to stimulate competition would be strong
is not surprising. Unlike adjustments to rates for captive
customers, agency actions which increase the purchase options of customers or which facilitate the development of
their own supplies do not merely constrain the earnings of
regulated utilities but may threaten previously stable mar' Nevertheless, it would be wrong to vary interpretakets."98
tions of statutory terms between those cases raising traditional rate issues and cases with broader structural implications for the industry involved. The D.C. Court of Appeals
noted the close relationship between the Commission's traditional rate regulation responsibilities and its duty to examine the competitive practices of electric utilities:
[O]ne would be hard put to think of a matter of
more direct and proper concern to the Commission
Cir. 1979) (restrictive power pool membership provisions modified to extend
pool membership to smaller utilities); Florida Power & Light Co., Opinion
No. 57 (FERC issued Aug. 3, 1979), 32 PuB. UTIL. REP. 4th 313 (1979)
(refusal to sell wholesale power found unreasonable exercise of monopoly
power).
61,114 (1980);
191. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 11 F.E.R.C.
63,036
Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 13 F.E.R.C.
(1980) (Initial Decision) complaint withdrawn and decision vacated as
moot, 20 F.E.R.C. 1 61,406 (1982).
192. Commission references to ICA and common law standards of justness and
reasonableness date back to the FPC's earliest rate cases under the Gas
and Power Acts. See, e.g., Willmut Gas & Oil Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line
Co., 12 F.P.C. 132 (1953); Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 132 (1940).
The courts have also relied upon ICA precedents to review Commission rulings. See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961);
St. Michaels Utilities Comm'n v. FPC, 377 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1967).
193. This is not to suggest that rate regulation carries no competitive consequences. The price squeeze cases in particular address claims that a wholesale supplier has raised rates to its wholesale customers in order to disadvantage them in competing for retail customers which both the supplier
and the wholesale customer wish to serve. Conway Corp. v. FPC, 426 U.S.
271 (1976). Price squeeze claims have been the focus of numerous recent
Commission proceedings.
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than the state of competition in the regulated industry. By doing whatever is within its power to
enhance that competition, the Commission serves
the same objective as it does by direct regulation of
price; indeed, Commission decisions affecting the
structure of the power industry could scarcely be
made rationally without regard to the impact they
will have on the competitive climate.194
To the extent that requested agency actions can be characterized as the impermissible imposition of common carrier
obligations on contract carriers, the battleground tends to
shift from a traditional assessment of "wrongdoing" to a
determination of what, if anything, the agency can do about
it.
The NYSEG and FP&L decisions, in particular, illustrate this issue. In both cases the courts vacated Commission actions but indicated that the Commission remained
free to consider competitive issues and to modify transmission agreements, provided that its orders did not expand a
pre-existing voluntary wheeling commitment."' The difficulties in applying this standard are readily apparent. While
the decisions suggest that modification may be appropriate,
they do not explain when a modification is acceptable and
when it impermissibly "expands" a voluntary undertaking.
Presumably, in the courts' view, an adjustment to the
utility's rate is permissible, although this is not explicitly
addressed in the NYSEG and FP&L decisions. 6 To require
194. NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 662
(1976).
195. Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d at 676 (5th Cir. 1981); New
York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d at 402-03 (1980).
196. The Fifth Circuit distinguishes FP&L frorm Town of Norwood v. FERC
(587 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1978)), where only the question of rate discrimination between wheeling customers was at issue. FP&L, the court noted,
had not contested Commission authority to remove undue rate discrimination. Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d at 675 (5th Cir. 1981).
It is at least arguable that a utility's voluntary decision to wheel is premised upon all the conditions underlying that decision, including the rate
which it finds acceptable. If one is to apply the common law distinction
between common and private carriage in this context, it is necessary to
recognize that the contract carrier not only can choose its customers, but
serve them "on terms and at rates satisfactory to him at the time." Home
Ins. Co. v. Riddell, 252 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1958) (emphasis added). Thus
agency action to adjust the utility's rate downward, below a level satisfactory to the utility may force the utility to "expand" its wheeling commitment beyond that originally contemplated and voluntarily undertaken.
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additional wheeling to a given customer is not."" Neither is
an order requiring the utility to file its voluntary wheeling
policy with the agency."' In FP&L the Fifth Circuit left
little doubt, moreover, that Commission orders extending
transmission service to previously excluded customers, in
the absence of a tariff, are not appropriate remedies for
undue discrimination, 9 ' although it specifically pretermitted
decision on that question, at least insofar as the alleged
discrimination could be shown to have anticompetitive
effects."'0
Services versus Rates and Transmission versus Wholesale
Service
The NYSEG and FP&L decisions suggest that distinctions can be drawn (1) between Commission jurisdiction
over rates and service and (2) between transmission service
and other services subject to Commission regulation. Neither
distinction is logically tenable.
The necessary connection between rates and services
was clearly articulated by the Third Circuit in Michigan
Consolidated Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.2°0
There the court rejected arguments that Commission jurisdiction over a pipeline's rates and charges would not permit
it to regulate the pipeline's practices with respect to the
extension of services to various customers. The court stated:
We are not required and do not decide that the
Commission has power to enforce contractual obligations. We do hold that adequacy and impartiality
of service, in the light of existing circumstances,is
197. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d at 402-03 (1980).
198. Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d at 677 (5th Cir. 1981).
199. The court expresses "serious doubts" that a petition seeking such relief
would be successful. Id. at 675. Its further explanation that no cases
raising similar discrimination claims for wheeling or any other services
were cited where there was not a tariff already on file, appears to be in
error. Richmond Power & Light Co. v. FERC, (574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir.
1978)), cited by the court at p. 678, is just such a case. Moreover, there
are a number of cases decided by the Commission in which discrimination
complaints about the availability of service have been raised in the absence
of a filed tariff.
200. 660 F.2d at 679.
201. 173 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1949).
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within Commission control. This must be so if control over rates means anything, since adequate service is a necessary concomitant in the fixing of reasonable rates. If this is so in respect to private utilities it must be even more important in the case of
utilities which are affected with a public interest.
If the Commission has no authority to order adequate service to customers, in view of all the conditions and circumstances involved, the basic purpose
of the Natural Gas Act fails of realization. We can
attribute to the Congress no purpose to withhold
from the Commission control over services. The
ower to prevent preferences and discrimination
oth as between individuals and classes, carried
with it by necessary and inescapable implication,
authority to regulate service."'
There is no sound basis, moreover, for applying different interpretations to the Commission's filing requirements °3
or to its standards for measuring the lawfulness of rates
and services, based on whether the rate schedules in question
involve electric transmission or other jurisdictional electric
and gas services. The reasons for rejecting this distinction
are two-fold.
First, sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act
do not distinguish between transmission and sales for resale,
insofar as the statutes are intended to reach unjust, unreasonable or unduly discriminatory rates, classifications
and practices.204 Moreover, nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended to limit the Commission's
remedial authority to revise unreasonable or unduly dis202. Id. at 789. (emphasis added). The Commission has long taken a similar
view of its jurisdiction. See United Gas Pipeline Co., 46 F.P.C. 786, 800
(1971) (NGA interpreted as extending to protect against undue discrimination in rates and services); Wilimut Gas & Oil Co., 12 F.P.C. 132 (1953)
(NGA applies equally to rates and services).
203. The court in Florida Power & Light for example, notes that the Commission
has long required gas pipelines to file statements of their service availability policies and that this requirement i3 similar to the one impermissibly imposed on FP&L. 660 F.2d at 677 (citing Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 34 F.P.C. 621, 626 (1965)).
204. This is a point recognized in the Commission's regulations. For purposes
of its filing regulations under section 205 (c) of the Federal Power Act, the
Commission requires utilities to file "full and complete rate schedules" for
all jurisdictional electric services they render. 18 C.F.R. § 35.1(a) (1981).
The FERC regulations define "electric services" to include transmission of
power in interstate commerce. 18 C.F.R. § 35.2 (1981).
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criminatory power resale contracts."' An elementary rule of
statutory construction is that effect must be given, to the
extent possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a
statute.0 6 Consequently judicial attempts to limit a statute
to less than all of the applications reasonably called for by
its own terms are considered invalid attempts at judicial
07
legislation.2
Section 201 of the Federal Power Act is itself quite clear.
It declares that [f]ederal regulation... of the transmission
of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is necessary in
the public interest. . . .,o The reference is carried over
into section 206, which authorizes the Commission to modify
jurisdictional contracts for the "transmission or sale" of
electric energy. 09 In Federal Power Commission v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 10 the Supreme Court rejected a claim by the
respondent that the Commission could exercise jurisdiction
over the transportation of natural gas only where the company was engaged in both the transportation and sale for
resale of natural gas in interstate commerce. Construing
provisions of the Natural Gas Act which are analogous to
the Federal Power Act's references to "transmission" and
"sales for resale," '11 the Court reasoned:
Respondents contend, however, that the word
"transportation" in § 1.(b) must be construed as
applying only to companies engaged in the business
of transporting gas in interstate commerce for
hire or for sales to be followed by resales, whereas
East Ohio does neither. The short answer is that
the Act's language did not express any such limitation. Despite the unqualified language of § 1(b)
making the Act apply to "transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce," respondents ask us to
205. Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1971).
206. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955); American Radio Relay
League v. FCC, 617 F.2d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
207. Trade Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82. 99 (1879).
208. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1978) (emphasis added).
209. 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1978).
210. 338 U.S. 464 (1950).
211. Parallel provisions of the Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts are to be
read in pari materia. Federal Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350
U.S. 348, 353 (1956).
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qualify that language by applying it only to businesses which both transport and sell natural gas for
resale. They rely on a sentence in the declaration
of policy, § 1(a), referring to "the business of
transporting and selling natural gas." But their
contention that the word "and" in the policy provision creates an unseverable bond is completely refuted by the clearly disjunctive phrasing of § 1 (b)
itself. As we pointed out in Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S.
507, 516, § 1 (b) made the Natural Gas Act applicable to three separate things: "(1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2)
its sale in interstate commerce for resale; and (3)
natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale." And throughout the Act "transportation" and "sale" are viewed as separate subjects
of regulation. They have independent and equally
important places in the Act. Thus, to adopt respondents' construction would unduly restrict the Commission's power to carry out one of the major policies of the Act.2 12
Second, to the extent that the distinctions between
transmission and sales for resale suggested by the courts in
FP&L and NYSEG rest upon the premise that Congress
rejected common carrier status for utilities, those distinctions are vulnerable to criticism. While it is true that
utilities are not transmission common carriers under the
FPA, 13 they are no more so with respect to sales for resale.
The oft-cited 14 common carrier provision included in Congressman Rayburn's bill proposing the Public Utility Holding Company Act, which was rejected by Congress in favor
of a more limited version in 1935, would have imposed an
obligation not only to transmit for others upon reasonable
request, but to sell or exchange power as well.21 The same
bill would have granted the FTC identical powers with re212. 338 U.S. at 468 (emphasis added).
213. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973) ; Richmond
Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
214. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. at 375-76 (1973);
Richmond Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d at 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Sunflower Elec. Coop. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 603 F.2d 791, 798-801
(10th Cir. 1979).
215. Section 202(a), H.R. 5423, S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). See supra
note 149.
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spect16 to the transportation and sale for resale of natural
2
gas.
Thus, under the Federal Power Act, the power to compel not only wheeling, but any "coordination of facilities is
left to the voluntary action of the utilities. 2 17 Wholesale
contracts, as a consequence, are also essentially voluntary,
and with the exception of compulsory interconnection under
section 202(b), the Commission cannot compel sales for
resale either. 21' Nor can it compel pooling.21 All of these
services result from voluntary commercial relationships governed "in the first instance by business judgment and not
regulatory coercion .... ,,2o Given the Natural Gas Act's
parallel legislative history, the same can forcefully be said
for gas pipeline services.
The implications of Congress's choice to reject common
carrier regulation of gas pipelines and electric utilities cannot logically be limited solely to those cases involving the
transmission of electric power. 22 1 As a consequence, the
FP&L and NYSEG decisions may have ramifications far
216. Id. Section 303 (a) of that bill provided:
It shall be the duty of every distributor to furnish natural gas to,
exchange natural gas with, and transmit natural gas for any person upon reasonable request therefor; and to furnish and maintain such services and facilities as shall promote the safety, comfort, and convenience of all customers, employees, and the public,
and shall in all respects be adequate, efficient, and reasonable.
(emphasis added).
A later bill, introduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 5711 by
Ohio Congressman Crosser and as S. 1919 by Senator Brown of Michigan,
(also not adopted) would have obligated a pipeline if it elected "to act as
a common carrier," to accept for transportation, at a "fair rate" and
without "unjust discrimination" gas tendered by shippers in the pipeline's
vicinity. H.R. 5711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); S. 1919 75th Cong., 1st
Sess .(1937).
217. H.R. REP. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1935).
218. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. at 373-74 (1973). Note
that a similar provision authorizing direct interconnections between a gas
pipeline and a distributor is contained in section 7(a) of the Natural Gas
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a) (1976).
219. Central Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
220. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. at 374 (1973) (emphasis
added).
221. In a recent case before an administrative law judge of the FERC, for
example, it was argued by the company that the Commission had no
authority to modify the utility's availability clause for wholesale power.
The company cited New York State Elec. & Gas Co. v. FERC for this
proposition. Northern States Power Co. (Wisc.) 18 F.E.R.C. 1163,022,
65,089 (1982). The judge, finding the proposed clause reasonable, did
not reach the issue. Id.
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beyond those ever contemplated by the Fifth or the Second
Circuits. Support for the above proposition can be inferred
from the otherwise unexplained failure of either court to
discuss the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in Central Iowa
2 or to distinguish it from their
Power Cooperativev. FERC1
respective holdings.
Central Iowa involved a challenge to certain provisions
in the Mid-Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP), a coordination agreement between several midwestern utilities providing for the sale and exchange of various electric services,
including economy, maintenance, emergency, and transmission services, among others. The complaining systems argued that the pool agreement was exclusionary and anticompetitive. Therefore, they contended, membership in the
pool should be opened."'
The Commission held that the pool was indeed exclusionary and that it unreasonably discriminated against
smaller utilities. However, it rejected the complainants'
argument that the pool was inadequate unless more services
were added. The Commission concluded that while membership provisions could and would be modified to eliminate
discrimination,"2 ' the agency was powerless to order an expansion in the scope of pool services beyond those voluntarily
initiated by the members, unless the absence of such services
rendered the pool agreement unreasonable or unduly discriminatory.2 25
Both the existing pool members and the complainants
appealed. Citing Congressional rejection of the common carrier provision in the original draft of the Federal Power
Act,2 81 the MAPP defendants argued that the Commission's
"determination with respect to the pool membership provisions ... constitute[d] a directive to the pool 'to offer more
222. 606 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
223. Id. at 1166-67.
224. Id.

225. Id. at 1167-68.
226. See supra notes 214, 215 and acompanying text.
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services' and to expand the scope and objectives of the
227
pool.M
That argument is strikingly like the one advanced by
NYSEG and accepted by the Second Circuit in NYSEG. The
D.C. Circuit however, affirmed the Commission's decision
and, citing the Commission's opinion, ruled that while the
decision to pool is "in the first instance a matter for the
utilities involved," once entered into, the pool agreement had
to meet the standards imposed by the Federal Power Act.228
As the court explained, Congress anticipated that "'enlightened self-interest'" of utilities would lead to voluntary coordination, but that if arrangements developed which did
29
not comport with the public interest, they could be modified.
The Commission recently offered a similar explanation of
its authority: "The freedom to voluntarily coordinate is not
an absolute license ' 230 and, though initially voluntary, "any
rate schedule" must comply with sections 205 and 206 of
the Act. 21
The Central Iowa decision is significant in several respects. Most important, it supports the Commission's authority to remedy undue discrimination not only by equalizing services among existing wholesale customers, but also
by extending those services to previously excluded systems.
Second, it establishes the principle that this power exists
even where the Commission has no authority to compel a
utility to provide the service initially. Third, it attempts to
draw a meaningful distinction between the initial voluntary undertaking over which the agency exerts little or limited control, and the activity once undertaken, when the
utility becomes subject to the full panoply of the agency's
regulatory powers. In all the respects set out above, the
Central Iowa decision takes a more expansive view of the
227. Brief for Petitioners at 28, Central Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d
1159 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
228. 606 F.2d at 1167, 1170-71 n.46.
229. Id. at 1168.
230. City of Frankfort v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 12 F.E.R.C. at 61,004, 61,010
(1980), vacated in part on other grounds, 20 F.E.R.C.
61,173 (1982).
231. Id. (emphasis added).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/1

48

Reiter: Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract C
CONTRACT CARRIER REGULATION

1983

Commission's powers than that taken by the courts in the
NYSEG and FP&L decisions.
The Central Iowa decision itself was foreshadowed by
the D.C. Circuit Court's decision a year earlier in Richmond
Power & Light v. FERC2 s There the court was faced with a
claim by a municipal utility that certain wheeling agreements
entered into between Indiana and Michigan Electric Company (I&M) and several other utilities were discriminatory. The gravamen of the muncipality's complaint was
that I&M's decision to wheel power for other utilities and
its consequent refusal to do so for Richmond was unduly
discriminatory and in violation of the Federal Power Act.
The court rejected Richmond's claim on the facts presented, but did not rule out the possibility that relief similar
to that requested might be available where the complaining
utility could demonstrate that the discrimination was undue:
[R]ichmond spurned the opportunity to demonstrate that particular activities were unreasonably
anticompetitive or discriminatory and claimed instead that the mere failure to wheel energy to and
from Richmond while wheeling for any other utility
was unlawful discrimination. With the issue thus
narrowed, the Commission correctly ruled that since
Congress made wheeling voluntary an individual
decision to wheel for one customer but not for
another is not automatically discriminatory. This
rejection of a per se rule follows logically from the
congressional refusal to impose common-carrier duties on electric utilities. Thus Richmond had an
obligation, which it failed to meet, of presenting
a prima facie case that I&M's actions were the result of anticompetitive intentions or, perhaps, were
at least unreasonable.2 "
The Central Iowa decision did not specifically address
the Commission's authority to compel wheeling"3 ' as a remedy
232. 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
233. Id. at 623-24 (footnotes omitted).
234. The Commission in Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Agreement, did not
directly refer to expansion of the wheeling obligation. 58 F.P.C. 2632
(1977). It is clear enough that its order requiring the existing MAPP
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for undue discrimination. Its underlying rationale, nevertheless, represents a logical extension of the Richmond case.
While Richmond suggests that electric services can be extended to new customers as a remedy for undue discrimination upon a proper showing, Central Iowa confirms the
availability of that remedy.
Dealing as they do with undue discrimination, the
court's decisions in CentralIowa and Richmond possess additional significance. They touch, albeit indirectly, upon the
distinction between indiscriminate, absolute common carriage obligations and the qualified right of the contract carrier under the FPA and NGA to choose customers individually. Because the claim of undue discrimination is likely to
be the excluded customer's most potent claim to pipeline or
transmission access, the breadth of Commission authority to
remedy undue discrimination is a critical issue. The next
section deals with the concept of undue discrimination as
applied to contract carriers under the Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts. It further attempts to fashion workable
distinctions between discrimination remedies and common
carrier duties.
Service Discrimination: The Problem of Access to Essential
Facilities
Basically, the Commission's duty when presented with
claims of undue discrimination, is to assure that rates and
terms of service do not differ significantly or unreasonably
for similarly situated customers.3 5 The Commission is obpool members to establish a rate schedule for transmission services for the
benefit of those new members too small to reciprocate for pool transmission
services by making their own transmission facilities available in kind for
use by other pool members, did indeed extend transmission or wheeling
services to new customers. Section 19.08 of the Agreement originally provided that nothing was "to 'be construed as obligating any of the Participants to wheel power and energy for others not Participants under this
Agreement.'" Fairman and Scott, Transmission, Power Pools, and Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1179 n.89
(1977). New participants, by definition, would receive wheeling as one
of the pool services to which they would be entitled, i.e., at least the limited
wheeling provided by the pool agreement.
235. Public Service Co. of Ind. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204, 1213 (7th Cir. 1978);
Sebring Utilities Comm'n v. FERC, 591 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979); St. Michaels Utilities Comm'n v. FPC 377
F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1967). This standard is essentially the test employed
under the Interstate Commerce Act for unjust discrimination. St. Michaels
Utilities Comm'n v. FPC, 377 .F.2d at 915 (4th Cir. 1967).
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liged moreover, to make "every effort" to eliminate undue
preference demonstrated to exist." 6 Not all discrimination
is undue, but the absence of a "reasonable basis for distinction" among customers will constitute grounds for the finding of a violation."'
The courts have characteristically described the Commission's authority to remedy violations of the Natural Gas
and Power Acts in broad and sweeping terms. The Commission's powers, the D.C. Circuit has held, are at their "zenith"
in fashioning remedies and sanctions for violations of statutes it administers. 3 8 Its broad statutory responsibilities,
the Supreme Court observed, "demand a generous construcMoreover, once a matter
tion of its statutory authority."2
is found to be a proper subject of concern for the Commission, it is empowered, according to the Third Circuit, "to
exercise wide discretion in selecting the tools with which to
safeguard the public interest."24 Where the claim involves
undue discrimination, the Sixth Circuit maintains that Commission remedial authority is in fact, "without limitation. 241
The Supreme Court has held that an action under the
ICA to enforce the duty to serve on reasonable demand will
lie against a common carrier independent of any claim that
Lacking
the carrier has been unjustly discriminatory.4
Commission
authority under a common carrier statute, the
is bound by the familiar principle that it is prohibited from
doing indirectly, that which it has no power to achieve
directly.4 3 Thus, as the D.C. Circuit Court admonished in
Richmond, utilities do not "bootstrap themselves into common-carrier status by filing rates for voluntary service.
*..,,_141 However, that court pointed out, they may be subject
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
.-244.

Town of Norwood v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1306, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Sebring Utilities Comm'n v. FERC, 591 F.2d at 1009 (5th Cir. 1979).
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588, 606 (3d Cir. 1977).
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 173 F.2d
784, 789 (6th Cir. 1949). But see Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FPC,
204 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1953).
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Sonman Shaft Coal Co., 242 U.S. 120, 125 (1916).
Northern Cal. Power Agency v. FPC, 514 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); California v. FPC 369 U.S. 482 (1962); City
of Paris v. FPC, 399 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
574 F.2d at 620.
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to claims raising the "analytically separate" issue of undue
discrimination. 45
The concept of an analytical distinction between the
duty of a common carrier and the duty to serve without
undue discrimination is not inconsistent with a broad Commission mandate to protect the public against anticompetitive practices by NGA and FPA contract carriers. Where
statutory schemes are aimed, not at the protection of common
'
and "monopolistic
carriers,"' but at "abusive practices"247
2
48
forces, 1 the duty to consider antitrust policy entrusted to
the agency would seem to demand the "generous construction
of its statutory authority,""" particularly when discriminatory practices threaten competitive injury.
The FERC has stated that the "prohibitions against
undue discrimination protect not only existing customers
against unfair differences in rates and terms, but also those
being denied service altogether.""25 There is little reason to
conclude that where the protection of competitive interests
is so clearly an agency mandate, the mere absence of
common carrier authority necessarily limits the protections
of antidiscrimination provisions to existing customers.
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. FPC,25' is a useful
case in point. In 1920, Congress enacted the Mineral Leasing Act,252 requiring, among other things, that oil and gas
pipelines traversing federal lands accept as a condition of
any right-of-way granted by the Secretary of the Interior
245. Id. at 622.
246. This, as discussed earlier, is the primary thrust of traditional contract
carrier regulation. See supra notes 158 and 159.
247. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973).
248. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397-98 (1974).
249. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 776 (1968).
250. City of Frankfort v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 12 F.E.RC. 61,004, 61,012 n.9
(1980), vacated in part on other grounds, 20 F.E.R.C. f 61,173 (1982) (citing Central Iowa Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.
1979), and Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. E-9565
(FERC Order issued Aug. 1, 1979). Compare Texas Deepwater Port Au61,211 (Mar. 7, 1979) (interpreting Interstate Comthority, 6 F.E.R.C.
merce Act, FERC held that oil pipeline service could not be offered to some
customers and denied to others similarly situated).
251. 169 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 853 (1948).
252. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-194, 201-209, 211-214, 221, 223-229, 229a, 241, 251, 261-263
(1976 & Supp IV 1980).
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the duty to transport as common carriers. The Mondakota
Gas Company, a corporation formed for the purpose of
distributing gas, had complained to the FPC in 1941 that
the refusal of Montana-Dakota Utilities Company to transport its gas supplies or to file rates for the transportation of
gas violated both the pipeline's common carrier duties under
the Mineral Leasing Act and the NGA's prohibition against
undue discrimination. The FPC agreed, and, in an order
issued March 22, 1946, "- directed the pipeline to file a
transportation tariff and to offer transportation services
over its entire pipeline system at non-discriminatory rates
no higher than it charged for transportation of its own gas
supplies sold at wholesale. 2"
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the defendant pipeline
raised two arguments which the court quickly rejected: (1)
that the pipeline fulfilled its obligations as a common carrier
under the Mineral Leasing Act by acting as a common purchaser, and (2) that since it had no rates on file with the
Commission, the FPC, limited by statute to reviewing existing rates, was without authority to act.255 In addition, the
pipeline raised two other arguments. It urged that Mondakota, not then an operating gas distributor, lacked standing to complain of discrimination.25 Finally, the pipeline
contended, the Commission's orders extended a duty to transport over the Company's entire system rather than simply
those of the Company's pipelines subject to the Mineral Leasing Act.25
253. Mondakota Gas Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 5 F.P.C. 64 (1946).
254. Id. at 77-82.
255. 169 F.2d at 396-98. The Court observed that Montana-Dakota, having
accepted a common carrier grant and an obligation to serve, fell within
the Commission's powers under section 4(c) of the Natural Gas Act,
requiring pipelines to file rate schedules for gas transportation service.
A question exists as to whether this obligation distinguishes MontanaDakota from Florida Power & Light, which exempts corporate wheeling
policies from the Commission's filing requirements where such policies are
the result of "voluntary" undertakings. This question was presented in
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC (No. 79-1882, D.C. Cir., filed May 17,
1982), an appeal of an order of the FERC directing the utility to file
certain nuclear power plant license conditions (where license conditions
required utility to wheel power for neighboring systems). The Commis61,246 (1980)),
sion's order, Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., (11 F.E.R.C.
was affirmed per curiam without opinion. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v.
FERC, 679 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
256. 169 F.2d at 398-99.
257. Id.
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On the issue of standing, the court upheld the Commission's determination that the complainant had a valid interest under the statute.25 The court found equally unpersuasive Montana-Dakota's argument that any Commission remedy for undue discrimination could extend only to those portions of the company's system traversing public lands. An
effective remedy for undue discrimination, the court held,
could not be so limited. The court's words are instructive:
Under these circumstances no feasible plan is suggested to eliminate discrimination, and it does not
appear that any effective regulatory rate order
could be entered to achieve that result, without including the entire system. Moreover, section 5 (a)
of the Natural Gas Act does not prescribe an exclusive means or method to be applied by the Commission for removing a discriminatory rate or practice. On the other hand, section 5 (a) of the Natural
Gas Act provides that when discrimination is found
to exist the Commission "shall determine the just
and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule,
regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter
observed and in force, and shall fix the same by
order.... ." We hold that the Commission's powers
are adequate under the circumstances shown here
to enter its order prescribing a rate schedule for
petitioner's entire connected interstate system.25
The Mineral Leasing Act itself draws a distinction between common carriage and discrimination. As originally
enacted, section 28 of the statute provided in relevant part:
258. Id. The Commission observed that Mondakota was a bona fide entity fully
capable of entering the gas distribution business, if provided access to
defendant's pipeline system which was the only feasible means of transporting gas to markets in the area. It held that the law clearly was intended to protect would-be producers and distributors and that imposing a
requirement upon complainants that they be presently operating as producers or suppliers "would establish a vicious circle out of which the complainant could not successfully break." Mondakota Gas Co. v. MontanaDakota Utilities Co., 5 F.P.C. at 71 (1946). This view is consistent with
the antitrust law protections afforded potential entrants denied access to
"bottleneck" or essential facilities. See, e.g., Gamco, Inc. v. Providence
Fruit and Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484, 488 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 817 (1952); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13
(1945); United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 60 (D.C.
Minn. 1971), a!f'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
259. 169 F.2d at 399. Several years after the court's decision, the common
carrier provision of the Mineral Leasing Act was repealed. See infra
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[R]ights of way through the public lands... of the
nited States are hereby granted for pipeline purposes for the transportation of oil or natural gas
to any applicant possessing the qualifications provided in section [181 of this title] . . . upon the

express condition that such pipe lines shall be constructed, operated, and maintained as common
carriers.
20

In 1935, the Act was amended, (1) by substituting "may
be granted by the Secretary of the Interior" for "are granted," (2) by adding "and conditions" following "regulations,"
and (3) by adding to the language following "maintained
as common carriers":
and shall accept, convey, transport, or purchase
without discrimination,oil or natural gas produced
from Government lands in the vicinity of the pipe
line in such proportionate amounts as the Secretary
of the Interior may, after a full hearing with due
notice thereof to the interested parties and a proper
finding of facts, determine to be reasonable .... "I
Prompted by the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in Chapman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 02 Congress in 1953
note 263. Montana-Dakota subsequently sought and received release from
its common carrier status. Mondakota Gas Co. v. FPC, 232 F.2d 358 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
260.. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1920), 41 Stat. 449 (emphasis added).
261. 49 Stat. 678-79 (1935) (emphasis added).
262. 204 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The essential facts in Chapman are these.
The El Paso Natural Gas Pipeline Company had received a certificate of
public convenience and necessity from the FPC to construct a pipeline
from eastern New Mexico, across northern Arizona and to the San Francisco Bay area. Since the pipeline's route crossed federal lands, it was
required to and did secure right-of-way permits from the Secretary of the
Interior, which permits obligated the Company to operate the pipeline as
a common carrier. In March 1951, the Secretary indicated to the Company
that no further right-of-way permits would be issued unless the Company
agreed to the additional condition that it would upon request and within
such time prescribed by the Secretary, increase the lines capacity to accommodate additional gas shipments in accordance with detailed regulations
spelled out by the Secretary. El Paso, then within 32 miles of the line's
completion, sought and secured an injunction from the district court, (Chapman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 192 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1951)) which held
that the Secretary had exhausted his authority by requiring the pipeline
to act as a common carrier. 204 F.2d at 53.
On appeal by the Secretary, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the
lower court ruling, holding that conditions required by the Secretary
amounted to detailed regulation of the pipeline's operation, the authority
for which rested solely with the Federal Power Commission. Id. at 52. But
of. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Morton, 504 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1974) (hold-
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amended section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act by exempting gas pipelines from common carrier obligations under
the statute."' Although the 1953 amendment refers to exemption from the common carrier "provisions," it is unlikely
that use of the plural "provisions" was intended to include
the 1935 amendment prohibiting discrimination in the transportation of gas produced on federal lands.264 The 1935
amendment was included not to enforce the common carrier
requirements of the 1920 legislation,2"' but in response
to the problem existing at that time, "that pipelines
serving gas producers on private lands refused to buy or
transport gas produced from leases on Federal lands being
drained from the adjacent private lands."26

263.

264.

265.
266.

ing that regulations imposing detailed wheeling requirements upon utility
seeking right-of-way did not exceed Interior Secretary's authority).
Interestingly, the court did not conclude that common carrier operation
was inappropriate for the gas pipeline industry, as is suggested in the
legislative history of the Mineral Leasing Act Amendments of 1953. See
infra note 263. On the contrary, the court described the Natural Gas Act
and the Mineral Leasing Act's common carrier provisions as "fully compatible," and specifically rejected the proposition advanced by El Paso, that
the Natural Gas Act impliedly repealed the Mineral Leasing Act's common
carrier requirements. 204 F.2d at 52.
30 U.S.C. § 185 (1953). Apparently Congress was concerned that strict
application of the Act's common carrier provisions could disrupt contractual
relations and interfere with regulation under the Natural Gas Act, particularly since gas pipelines might not have sufficient capacity to provide
common carrier service to the public. See S. 2220, S. REP. No. 578, 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2357-58.
Adherents to the view that the Natural Gas Act gives FERC no authority
to compel transportation of gas as a remedy for undue discrimination have
pointed to the 1953 amendment as evidence supporting this proposition.
See, e.g., Brief for High Island Offshore System and U-T Offshore System
Opposing Exceptions at 13-23, High Island Offshore System, No. CP75-104,
et al. (filed Apr. 8, 1981).
See S. 1081, Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, S. REP. No. 207,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2417,
2469 (letter from Secretary of Interior).
Id. at 2440, 2468-69. The report itself is somewhat confusing on this point.
While distinguishing between 1) the discrimination protections for gas
produced on federal lands and 2) the common carrier requirements of the
1920 Act (Id. at 2440), it states at page 2441 that the 1953 amendments
removed "any requirement in federal statute that interstate natural gas
pipelines subject to the Natural Gas Act accept gas without unreasonable
discrimination-whether for transportation or for purchase."
Arguably such language suggests a substantial limitation on the Commission's Gas Act authority. A more logical construction would preserve
the Commission's authority to act where the pipeline had undertaken to
transport for some shippers, but would not obligate a pipeline transporting
only its own gas to take on any shippers without discrimination. Indeed
the former interpretation cannot be reconciled with the protections afforded
government leaseholders who retain a right to ship gas produced in the
vicinity of the pipeline without discrimination pursuant to the 1935
amendments now found in 30 U.S.C. § 185(r) (2) (A) and (B) (1973).
Under the Act's prorationing provisions in section (r) (2) (B), government leaseholders, moreover, would seem to retain rights to secure transportation over the pipeline, even where the pipeline is otherwise transport-
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Revisions to the Mineral Leasing Act included in the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973,207 retained
these distinctions;2"' the 1920 common carrier provisions and
the 1935 amendment are now codified as separate successive
sentences (r) (1) and (r) (2) (A) and (B) in the statute.
According to the Senate report on the 1973 amendment, the
common carrier exemption for gas pipelines retained from
the 1953 amendment refers only to the first of the two
sentences."'
ing only its own gas. Such an interpretation follows logically from the
purpose of the 1935 amendment noted in the 1973 Senate Report "to
protect the Federal government's interest in both oil and gas as the
resource owner in such instances." Id. at 2440. A pipeline which transported its own gas could drain leaseholds on adjacent federal lands if not
required to transport gas from these properties.
The shipper's access rights to pipeline facilities traversing federal
land where it is also a government leaseholder could be a key means of
pipeline access in the future. A great proportion of new gas discoveries
are being made in the western United States. The federal government has
enormous land holdings in the west. See Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion:
Who Should Own Public Lands? 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505 (1980). Use of
the Mineral Leasing Act as a means to facilitate pipeline access is discussed
later in this article.
267. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (1973).
268. 30 U.S.C. §§ 185(r) (2) (A), (r) (2) (B) (1976). Indeed, subsection (r) (2)
(A) requires pipelines to "accept, convey, transport, or purchase without
discrimination all oil or gas delivered to the pipeline without regard to
whether such oil or gas was produced on Federal or non-federal lands."
(emphasis added). The next sentence, subsection (r) (2) (B), requires the
Secretary of the Interior to apportion pipeline capacity to accommodate
gas produced on federal lands.
Again, the Senate report is confusing. In discussing the provisions of
subsection (r) (2), the report discusses not two sentences, but one sentence
dealing with both the non-discrimination and prorationing requirements.
S. REP. No. 207, supra note 265, at 2440. It appears thus to be describing
provisions in S.1041 rather than the similar provisions of S.1081. Nevertheless, the report indicates that the non-discrimination provision of (r) (2)
is "in addition to the common carrier requirements described . . . in the

first sentence of the subsection," is not intended to limit the non-discrimination requirement to oil and gas produced on federal land and is not intended to be limited "in any way by the qualified exemption of natural gas
pipelines . . . from the general common carrier requirements of the first

sentence." Id. at 2440. (emphasis added). The report here would appear
to support the obvious import of the statutory language-i.e., that the 1973
amendment broadened the non-discrimination protections for those seeking
gas transportation but granted prorationing protection from the Interior
Department only to federal leaseholders. The pertinent Interior Department regulations are unhelpful in shedding any further light however.
Standard right-of-way conditions make no reference to common carrier
or non-discriminatory access requirements and draw no distinction between
oil and gas pipelines. See 43 C.F.R. § 2881.2 (1981).
The amendments to section 28 of the Act also adopted common purchaser requirements for gas pipelines traversing federal lands, extending
protection to gas producers not (1) covered by state common purchaser or
carrier regulations or (2) producing on federal leaseholds. 30 U.S.C. § 185
(r) (3) (B) (1973). The primary impetus for the amendment however was
that under prevailing court interpretations of the Act, the Secretary of
the Interior had insufficient authority to grant rights-of-way adequate
to accommodate newer, larger pipelines within the width limitations imposed
by the statute. S. REP. No. 207, upra note 265. at 2417.
269. S. REP. No. 207, supra note 265, at 2441.
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The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act27 (OCSLA) and
the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act 27 1 (ANGTA)
likewise reflect statutory distinctions drawn between regulation obligating gas pipelines to transport gas without discrimination and the imposition of common carrier status
upon the affected pipelines. Section 5(c) of the OCSLA, as
enacted in 1953, authorized oil and gas pipeline rights-of-way
across the submerged lands of the Outer Continental Shelf
upon the express condition that the pipelines granted such
rights-of-way would "transport or purchase without discrimination, oil or natural gas produced from said submerged
lands [or Outer Continental Shelf lands] in the vicinity of
the pipeline .

*...,=

The 1978 amendments to the Act27

recodified section 5(c) as 5(e) and added new section 5(f)
which required OCS pipelines to "provide open and nonaccess to both owner and non-owner shipdiscriminatory
,,274
pers.
Section 5(f) (1), according to the House Conference
Committee's report on the bill, was enacted to prevent, inter
alia, "'bottleneck monopolies' and other anticompetitive situations involving OCS pipelines 2 75 and was intended as a
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1334, 1337, 1340, 1343-1356 (Supp. IV 1980).
15 U.S.C. §§ 719-719o (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1953).
Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
43 U.S.C. § 1334(e), (f) (1973). These sections of the Act also authorized
the FPC to prorate inadequate capacity. This provision is retained in the
1978 Act and authority is transferred to the FERC. New sections 5(e)
and 5(f) provide in relevant part:
(e) Rights-of-way through the submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf, . . .may be granted for the transportation of oil,
natural gas, sulphur, or other minerals ... upon the express condidition that oil or gas pipelines shall transport or purchase without
discrimination, oil or gas produced from submerged lands or outer
Continental Shelf lands in the vicinity of the pipelines in such
proportionate amounts as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, may, after
a full hearing with due notice thereof to the interested parties,
determine to be reasonable, taking into account, among other
things, conservation and the prevention of waste.
(f) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), [exemption for gathering lines] every permit, license, easement, right-of-way, or other
grant of authority for the transportation by pipeline on or across
the outer Continental Shelf of oil or gas shall require that the
pipeline be operated in accordance with the following competitive
principles:
(A) The pipeline must provide open and nondiscriminatory
access to both owner and nonowner shippers....
275. H. REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 87 (1978).

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/1

58

Reiter: Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract C

1983

CONTRACT CARRIER REGULATION

"reaffirmation and strengthening of subsection 5(e). ''" s
Amendments proposed by Representatives Seiberling and
Udall, which would have required OCS pipelines to be operated as common carriers, were not adopted however. 2"
Section 13(a) of ANGTA. Ts was likewise enacted to
assure various shippers of access to the Alaska Natural Gas
Transportation System [ANGTS] and to prevent access
discrimination on the basis of ownership or non-ownership
in the pipeline facilities.2 " The Senate joint committee report2"' indicates that federal leaseholders would retain their
rights under the Mineral Leasing Act to non-discriminatory
access to the pipeline and that, "in the event adequate capacity is not available," the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to apportion shipments of other shippers in order to
accomodate the production from Federal lands [in the vicinity
of ANGTS]. '"'5 While ANGTA does not by its terms extend prorationing protection to shipments from non-federal
lands, 82 it does extend clear access rights to those shippers.
The legislative history and the FERC's interpretation of
ANGTA s1 support the view that, like OCSLA, ANGTA does
276. Id.
277. Id.; H. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
278. 15 U.S.C. § 719k (1976). Section 13(a) provides:
There shall be included in the terms of any certificate, permit,
right-of-way, lease, or other authorization issued or granted pursuant to the directions contained in section 719g of this title, a
provision that no person seeking to transport natural gas in the
Alaska natural gas transportation system shall be prevented from
doing so or be discriminated against in the terms and conditions
of service on the basis of degree of ownership, or lack thereof, of
the Alaska natural gas transportation system.
279. The Joint Report of the Senate Committees on Commerce and Interior and
Insular Affairs concluded that section 13 requires equal tariff treatment
for owner and non-owner shippers of "similar quantities of gas for similar
distances." S. REP. No. 1020, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 23 (1976). "This," the
Report notes, "is to assure that pipelines or distributors who are able
to purchase additional quantities of Alaska natural gas are able to transport such natural gas to their own system upon non-discriminatory terms."
Id. at 23. See also H. REP. No. 1658 Part 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 32 (1976).
280. S. REP. No. 1020, supra note 279.
281. Id.
282. In its 1978 order granting intervention and establishing intervention procedures for the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System certification
proceeding, the FERC took the view that the non-discriminatory access
requirements of the statute could be satisfied by treating equally all
shippers on a first-come-first-serve basis. Prorationing, it held, would
only be required to accommodate additional gas volumes from federal lands
entitled to such protection under the Mineral Leasing Act. Northwest
Alaska Pipeline Co., 3 F.E.R.C. 61,226, 61,605 (1978).
283. Id. at 4-5; 3 F.E.R.C. at 61,606-07. Neither the House nor Senate reports
refer to common carrier status regarding section 13(a), nor does the Act
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not impose common carrier obligations upon affected gas
pipelines.
In marked contrast to the statutory schemes prohibiting
undue discrimination in the transmission and sale of both
gas and electricity, are prohibitions against discrimination
in prices and services imposed by the Robinson-Patman Act.
Sections 2(a) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 4 extend that Act's protections only to a supplier's existing
customers,"' and itis well settled that refusals to deal with
are not actionable as discrimination under
new customers
the statute.2 "'
The Robinson-Patman Act itself does not regulate prices
nor is it intended to restrict the unregulated trader's cornitself use this term. As the FERC pointed out in its June 7, 1978 order
supra note 282, the FPC (predecessor to FERC) in its Recommendation
to the President, had construed section 13(a) as a common carrier provision, while the Justice Department took the contrary view, recommending in fact, that prorationing authority over all pipeline shipments be
added to the Act. Id. at 2; 3 F.E.R.C. at 61,606. The Commission persuasively argued, in addition, that reliance in the Senate Report upon the
Mineral Leasing Act for prorationing protection to shippers from Federal
leaseholds indicates that revocation of the common carrier exemption
contained in that Act was not likely intended by passage of ANGTA. Id.
at 4. This reasoning is consistent with the principle disfavoring repeals
by implication. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
284. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (e) (1976). Section 2(a) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality .... where the effect of such discrimi-

nation may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce ....
Section 2(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of
one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a
commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting or furnishing or by contributing to the furnishing of,
any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling,
sale or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon
terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionately equal
terms.
285. See Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974); Naifeh
v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 218 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1954); Shaw's
Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3rd Cir. 1939); H.A.B. Chemical
63,912 (C.D.
Co. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
Calif. 1980).
286. Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d at 294 (7th Cir. 1974); H.A.B.
Chemical Co., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at
75,748 (C.D. Calif. 1980). As the FTC held in Bird & Son, Inc.:
[T]he act does not purport to interfere with the right of a seller
to select his customers. He may discriminate in the choice of his
customers. Not until there is a discrimination in price among those
chosen does Section 2(a) of the act have any application.
25 F.T.C. 548,553 (1937).
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mon law right to deal with whom he chooses, where his actions are not intended to preserve or create a monopoly.287
This limitation on the scope of the Act follows naturally from
the specific proviso of section 2(a) preserving the rights of
sellers to "select their own customers
in bona fide trans288
actions and not in restraint of trade.1

No comparable limitation is to be found in the NGA or
the FPA, nor is one logically implied. While the RobinsonPatman Act will protect the buyer disadvantaged or squeezed
by a vertically integrated supplier who favors his own affiliated distributors, 8 ' and while there is no doubt that some
underlying notion of equity is involved, the Act's primary
purpose is to protect buyers against their competitors' receiving preferable treatment."' Gas and electric distributors are
far more likely to be competing with their vertically integrated suppliers than the typical customer entitled to RobinsonPatman Act protection. More important, termination91 or
denial of service to a gas or electric distributor is likely to
have disastrous consequences for the distributor's customers
who cannot readily switch suppliers. Financially sound
distributors (and indirectly their ultimate customers) in
unregulated, unconcentrated markets, by definition, have
practical choices among competing suppliers who will deal.
Thus, equal treatment among customers in the gas and electric industries preserves not only fairness and competitive
equality between customers, but protects customers in their
287. See Parke, Davis & Co. v. United States, 362 U.S. 29 (1960) ; United States
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) ; Bay City Abrahams, Inc. v. Estee
Lauder, Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,095 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ('Colgate
Doctrine' "permeates the entire Robinson Patman Act").
288. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1936). The proviso reads in relevant part: "[N]othing
herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or
merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide
transactions and not in restraint of trade; ...it
289. Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); Thomas v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 393 F. Supp. 58 (M.D. Penn. 1975). The Eighth Circuit has recently held that electricity is a "commodity" within the meaning
of the Robinson-Patman Act and that electric distributors have a cause
of action against their vertically integrated wholesale supplier that the
supplier is offering lower prices to its affiliated retail business. City of
Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir. 1982).
290. H.A.B. Chemical Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,912 at 75,748.
291. Electric utilities and natural gas pipelines are not permitted to abandon
service to existing customers without approval from the Commission.
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414, 422-24 (1952);
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 156 (1960).
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status as competitors of the supplier. Limiting the antidiscrimination protections of the FPA and NGA to existing
customers of pipelines or utilities would severely undercut
antitrust policies favoring that competition. "
CONTRACT CARRIAGE SOLUTIONS TO ANTICOMPETITIVE
AccEss LIMITATIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR
DRAWING THE LINE

At the risk of some criticism, both from those who believe that neither the NGA nor the FPA was intended to
address broad access issues and from those who believe that
nothing short of common carrier regulation can provide disadvantaged competitors effective redress, the author offers
the following proposals for consideration. Access to gas
transportation and electric transmission factilities can be
ordered in a manner consistent with the concept of contract
carriage. Minimum prerequisites to any access claim should
be established that are, consistent with the retention of contract-common carrier distinctions. Finally, where prerequisites are met, various avenues for effective relief exist under
the relevant statutory provisions. The outlines for this proposal follow below.
Prerequisites for Access
A. Essential Facilities
. It is proposed that a reasonable starting point for
analysis of an access claim is the determination whether any competitive interest is at stake. The bottleneck nature of transmission networks and gas pipelines has been discussed previously. Where those in possession of bottleneck monopolies
are vertically integrated, the potential for anticompetitive
mischief is ever present. The "essential facility" doctrine
292. The Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail clearly protects electric distribution systems against unreasonable actions, like refusals to wheel,
which limit their choice among competing power suppliers. 410 U.S. 366.
Section 603 of the OCSLA Amendments expresses a similar concern. 43
U.S.C. § 1862 (1978). Pursuant to section 603(h), it is the FERC's
responsibility "to encourage expanded participation by local distribution
companies in acquisition of leases and development of natural gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf by facilitating the transportation"
of distributors' OCS gas. See supra notes 64 and 65.
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comes into play here. It is described by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Hecht v. Pro-Football,Inc.29 as follows:
The essential facility doctrine, also called the 'bottleneck principle', states that 'where facilities cannot be practically duplicated by would-be competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to
be shared on fair terms. It is illegal restraint of
trade to foreclose the scarce facility. . .. To be
'essential' a facility need not be indispensable; it is
sufficient if duplication of the facility would be
economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap on potential market entrants.2"'
Unlike the common carrier obligation to serve, the essential facility doctrine is not self-enforcing."0 5 It requires
at least some minimal showing that the facilities in question
are, in fact, "essential." ' Moreover, consumers, not competitors are the intended primary beneficiaries of common
293. 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
294. Id. at 992 (footnotes omitted). See also Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945) (membership in news service held essential to competitive viability); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912)
(railroad switching facilities held essential facility); Gamco v. Providence
Fruit and Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 817 (1952) (warehouse distribution facility held essential). The
bottleneck or essential facilities doctrine has been applied in a number of
electric utility cases. See, e.g., United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331
F. Supp. 54, 59-61 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973)
(transmission network of utility held bottleneck facility); Town of Massena v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) %63,526,
at 76,799-801 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); City of Mishawaka v. American Elec.
Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981)
(transmission dominance evidence of defendant's monopoly power); Florida
Power & Light Co., No. ER78-19 (FERC Order issued Aug. 3, 1979), 32
PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th 313 (1979) (utility's control of transmission network
gave it "strategic dominance" over competitors); Cities of Anaheim v.
Southern Cal. Edison So., No. CV78-810-MML, (S.D. Calif.) (May 18,
1981) (unpublished) (partial summary judgment finding transmission facility owned by defendant Was essential to transmission of power from
Pacific Northwest to plaintiffs' systems); Alabama Power Co., 13 N.R.C.
1027, 1069-71, 1108-09 (1981), aff'd sub. nom, Alabama Power Co. v. NRC,
No. 81-7547 et al. (11th Cir. 1982) (nuclear license applicant's denial to
competitors of access to its nuclear plant and to its transmission system
held exercise of monopoly power).
295. See supra note 177.
296. Given the well recognized natural monopoly aspects of gas pipeline transportation and electric transmission, proof of bottleneck monopoly need not
inevitably become bogged down in long, drawn out evidentiary proceedings.
It would be quite feasible, for example, to adopt over time, certain legal
presumptions on a case-by-case basis or perhaps to establish "regional"
market definitions through rulemaking proceedings where generic findings
could be made regarding the existence of monopoly power in certain pipeline or electric transmission markets.
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carrier regulation." ' Antitrust principles which underlie the
essential facilities doctrine, although intended in large part
to protect consumer welfare, do so by preserving competitive opportunities. Access, in the antitrust context, thus
vindicates a competitive interest and, while those claiming
access rights to essential facilities need not be existing competitors," 8 they clearly must assert something beyond the
consumers' right to be served. Finally, the right to access
under antitrust principles is itself significantly limitedsharing of an essential facility is not required where either
impractical or injurious to adequacy of service to existing
customers of the facility's owner(s)."29 Nor is absolute
parity required. 00
B. Public Interest Factors
Adoption of the essential facilities doctrine as a threshhold test for NGA and FPA access claims, this author suggests, represents a significantly different approach than
that which would be dictated by a common carrier scheme of
regulation. In addition, the recognition of various public
interests which are entitled to protection under the Natural
Gas and Federal Power Acts may require the FERC to limit
297. See, e.g., Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
610 F.2d 1114, 1122 (3d Cir. 1979); City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co.,
671 F.2d at 1179 (8th Cir. 1982); Litton Sys. Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 487 F. Supp. 942, 951 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).
298. It is generally sufficient that the complaining party "has manifested an
intention to enter the business and has demonstrated his preparedness to
do so." Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d at 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing
Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966)).
299. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d at 992-93; Gamco v. Providence Fruit
and Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
817 (1952). Of course injury to the owner's existing customers is not
synonymous with higher costs to serve them; the owner of the bottleneck
facility is not permitted to claim loss of its unlawful monopoly advantage
as injury. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375
(1973). Rather, the limitations contemplated are that "reasonable criteria
of selection" e.g., "lack of available space, financial unsoundness, or possibly low business or ethical standards" might justify access restrictions
in given instances. Gamco v. Providence Fruit and Produce Bldg., Inc.,
194 F.2d at 487 (1st Cir. 1952).
300. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1360-61
(D.D.C. 1981) (rejecting defendant's motion for summary judgment against
government's claim that defendant telephone company had denied competitors reasonable access to essential facilities).
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even those access conditions which might otherwise be required on strictly antitrust principles.3 01
For example, in the gas industry context, the FERC and
its predecessor, the FPC have long recognized a hierarchy of
beneficial uses for natural gas; domestic uses for the gas
have generally been favored over industrial consumption of
gas as boiler fuel. 02 Under these circumstances, the Commission, recognizing the gas pipeline's broader mix of customers, might validly conclude that access to the pipeline,
where limited, need not be made available to an industrial
customer on the same terms as the pipeline supplies its
wholesale customers." 8 By the same token, there would be
little apparent justification for the pipeline to favor wholesale load over direct transportation service to gas distribution systems with customer mixes comparable to that of the
pipeline as gas supplier."0 4 The equitable claim of each to
pipeline capacity would be placed on the same footing.
301. See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
The Commission in Florida Power & Light Co., adopted a least anticompetitive alternatives test. 32 PuB. UTIL. REP. 4th 313 (1979). Although
such a test attempts to minimize competitive restraints, the Commission
recognizes by this test that there may be circumstances where other overriding public policy objectives require some compromise with pro-competitive principles.
302. See, e.g., FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co., 365 U.S. 1 (1961)
(end use, preemption of pipeline facilities and price are factors in evaluating certificate applications; conservation of gas is an underlying purpose
of the original Act); Consol. Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (end-uses of gas are factors in establishing gas curtailment scheme).
See also supra note 61.
303. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 47 F.P.C. 1318 (1972), rev'd and rem'd on other grounds,
Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (denial of
transportation certificate to transport direct sale of gas to electric utility).
See also Cerro Wire & Cable Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co., 677
F.2d 124 (1980) (Dismissing complaint of industrial gas user that transportation of its supplies under the pipeline's certificate were being unreasonably interrupted on grounds that industrial user had only contracted
for interruptible transportation service and that pipeline was entitled to
give priority to wholesale customers). One might query whether Cerro
Wire's complaint would have raised a question had rate or service discrimination been alleged. The Appellant had argued for the first time on
appeal that the pipeline [Transco] was imposing a "de facto tying arrangement, under which users cannot obtain transportation service from Transco
unless they purchase their gas from Transco." Cerro Wire & Cable Co. v.
FERC, 677 F.2d at 131. The court however, was precluded from considering this issue, which had not been raised before the Commission. Id.
304. Section 603 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978,
in fact encourages distributor access to gas produced on the Outer Continental Shelf. 43 U.S.C. § 1862 (1978). See supra note 64 and accompanying text. By contrast, the Commission has noted that many direct sale
industrial users would not have "as compelling an equitable claim to the
traditional sources of interstate system supply" as high priority users.
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Access claims might similarly be affected by legitimate
public interests in contract stability0 5 or capacity constraints
which may exist on the pipeline or the utility."'. All this
is not to emphasize that limitations on access may be justified, but that the existence of these limitations itself underscores the distinction between common carriage and the access guidelines here proposed. If one accepts the principle
that the scope of competitive interests protected under the
NGA and FPA includes the rights of competitors to access
to essential facilities, the Acts themselves support several
avenues of relief for those with legitimate access claims.
Avenues for Relief
A. Unreasonable Conditions of Service
Section 4 (a) 07 of the NGA and parallel section 205 (a) 0 1
of the FPA require that jurisdictional services be provided
on terms and at rates which are "just and reasonable."
Several cases before the FERC (none of which have at the
date of this writing been reviewed in the courts) have addressed a variety of claims that transmission service arrangements violated that statutory standard. Generally applicable tests of justness and reasonableness have been applied to determine variously that a utility's ability to terminate service at its sole discretion was arbitrary, overbroad
and hence unreasonable; 0 9 that a minimum service reservation of one year for all transactions inhibited short term
transactions and was unduly lengthy and unreasonable;3'10
that a maximum service reservation period of one year was
inadequate to secure long term supplies and was similarly

305.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See Preamble to FERC Order No. 27, 7 F.E.R.C. f 61,076, 44 Fed. Reg.
24,825, remanded on other grounds, First Miss. Corp. v6 FERC, No. 79-1765
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 1982).
See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961) (assured fuel supply is necessary for a public utility, hence a long-term arrangement may be critical to avoid service failure); United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. Mobil Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956) (gas industry characterized by need for stable contract relations).
See Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 204 F.2d 675, 681 (3d Cir.
1953).
15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1976).
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1976).
See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 11 F.E.R.C. 1 61,114 (1980); Florida
Power & Light Co., (Initial Decision) 12 F.E.R.C. 63,014 (1980), vacated
as part of settlement, 19 F.E.R.C. 61,269 (1982).
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 11 F.E.R.C.
61,114 (1980).
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unreasonable;311 that terms of service limiting the delivery
points available to the customer would reduce the customer's
reliability and hence place it at a competitive disadvantage
vis-a-vis the transmitting utility in efforts to attract and
retain customers;"'2 and that the insistence of the wheeling
utility upon individually negotiated rates for transmission,
rather than a generally available rate schedule was anticompetitive and unjustified even in the absence of refusals
to serve. " '
Transmission or transportation service offered at
rates so high that the customer would be unable to take
advantage of alternative supply opportunities can similarly
be considered as tantamount to the denial of access, " " or as
a form of "price squeeze."3"' Likewise, offers of interruptible service might be considered inadequate bases upon which
distributors or other transmission customers could adequately plan supply alternatives to wholesale service by the pipeline or the utility. Arguably, an access claim may lie against
the pipeline or utility which refuses to "unbundle" wholesale service to its customers-i.e., refuses to offer the transmission or transportation component of its service separately. " ' This list is not meant to be exhaustive but merely
to suggest the range of transmission or transportation constraints, the remedy for which might be the modification or
expansion of access.
63,014 (1980).
311. Florida Power & Light Co., 12 F.E.R.C.
312. Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Co., (Initial Decision) 13
F.E.R.C.
63,036 (1980). See supra note 81.
313. See supra note 309.
314. Offers to serve only at impractical terms and prices have been construed
as unlawful refusals to deal, when done to further monopoly power. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
315. Under a price squeeze theory, the vertically integrated supplier sells to
its competitor-customer one of the customer's necesary inputs, here transmission, at a price higher than it "charges" itself for the same input.
This theory has been applied to the production input where the wholesale
customer charges that its supplier is selling power at retail at a lower
price than it charges the squeezed wholesale distributor. See FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
316. Essentially, this theory analogizes wholesale service to a tying arrangement under which the supplier offers the tying product-transportation
(or transmission) only on condition that the customer purchase its gas
(or electric) supply from the supplier as well. A critical element of any
tying agreement is the existence of two distinct products or services. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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B. Undue Discrimination
This article has explored at some length the existence of
a distinction between common carrier obligations and the
duties imposed upon utilities and gas pipelines to avoid unjust discrimination. Like the prohibition against unreasonable rates, terms and conditions of service, the protection
afforded customers against undue discrimination represents
a logical and legitimate vehicle to vindicate meritorious
access claims. Its most significant value is its applicability
to those situations where competitors are denied service
offered others.
Apart from proof that the claimant is a bona fide potential entrant and that the utility or pipeline is in possession
of an essential facility, undue discrimination claims can be
reasonably limited in other ways. For example, the FERC,
in addressing a municipal electric distribution system's
claim that the neighboring larger utility had denied it various electric services necessary to enter the generating business, stated that discrimination claims must involve "reasonable possibilities of exclusion" and that "reasonable criteria of selection are certainly permissible." Reasonable
criteria are those which "relate to existing generating and
capacity limitations, the willingness of a customer to meet
fair and mutual obligations, or the prior existence of lawful
contracts taking precedence with the would-be purchasers." 17
Other limitations, relating to equity (such as curtailment priorities mentioned above), or differences in circumstance (i.e., the service specifically offered others cannot be
used by the excluded system without changing the nature of
61,004, at 61,011
317. City of Frankfort v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 12 F.E.R.C.
(1980). The Commission later vacated its opinion, finding that Frankfort
had not proved itself a potential entrant and that the Commission's earlier
The
61,173 (1982).
decision was therefore premature. 20 F.E.R.C.
FERC's reference to prior lawful contracts would not seem to preclude
any contract modification; for example, where the customer wished to
change suppliers but was precluded by an unreasonable long-term exclusive
dealing arrangement, modification might be justified. Similarly, the Commission has the authority to prorate capacity to eliminate undue discrimination even where existing contracts must be modified as a result. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 204 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1953). See
also Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 8 F.P.C. 139, 149 (1949) (available
capacity "must be apportioned equitably and fairly notwithstanding con-

tract provisions").
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the service) might also justify differences in treatment. Recognizing limits to the scope of undue discrimination remedies
may help the Commission avoid blurring the distinction between common carrier remedies and those available to the
class of undue discrimination complainants. Litigants with
valid discrimination claims, keeping such a framework in
mind, can better heed the Richmond court's admonition that
bare discrimination claims not act as a "bootstrap" whereby
a utility's isolated undertaking foists on it a general duty
to serve.
C. Certificates and Licenses
The Commission's certificatory authority under section 7
of the Natural Gas Act offers largely untested"'8 but potentially significant opportunities to address pipeline access
claims. Section 7(e) of the statute permits the Commission
to grant certificates for the construction and operation of
pipeline facilities upon such terms and conditions as may be
required by public convenience and necessity."1 ' The Commission has no comparable certificatory authority over the
318. The Commission itself has never ruled whether it has the authority to condition a certificate upon the applicant's willingness to transport gas purchased directly by distributors or others from the gas producer or supplier.
The only case to touch upon the issue left the question open. In Pacific Gas
Transmi8ion Co., the FPC approved separate proposals by Pacific Gas
Transmission Company and El Paso Natural Gas Company to construct
large scale gas pipelines to serve the California market, rejecting the
Presiding Examiner's recommendation that a single 42 inch diameter pipeline be constructed instead. 40 F.P.C. 1147 (1968). FPC Chairman White,
dissenting, would have approved a single, more efficient project subject
to the condition that the certificate holder could be required by the FPC
to transport its competitors' gas in future periods, thereby reducing El
Paso's market dominance in California. Id. at 1173-75. The majority did
not reject Chairman White's proposal on grounds that it lacked any such
authority, but rather because the competing pipelines themselves had
sought no such condition, the record did not support it as competitively
beneficial and such a condition would somehow reduce the Commission's
future flexibility by departing from traditional principles of natural gas
regulation. Id. at 1162-64.
Whatever the merits of the FPC's reasoning, its apparent reluctance
to embrace the concept of a transportation condition is to be contrasted
with the FERC's current policy respecting OCS gas supplies secured by
distributors. Although the Commission to date has not required that pipelines located onshore transport OCS gas purchased or produced by distributors, sections 284.243, 284.244 and 284.245 of the Commission's regulations authorize distributors to petition the Commission for amendments
to a pipeline's certificate where the pipeline has refused to transport the
gas. 18 C.F.R. §§ 284.243, 284.244 and 284.245 (1980). These sections
clearly indicate that the Commission contemplates, if not encourages, such
filings and the consequent tests of its certificate authority to compel
transportation of distributor-owned gas.
319. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1976).
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electric utility industry, but it does have substantial power
to condition licenses granted applicants to operate hydro2
elctric projects under part I of the Federal Power Act.1 1
Two potentially significant sources of new gas discoveries, the Outer Continental Shelf and federal lands in the
Overthrust Belt leased for gas production can significantly
enhance competition in the natural gas industry. Here, the
access protections afforded by the Mineral Leasing Act and
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act afford the Commission a unique opportunity, through its certificate authority,
to facilitate distributor, intrastate pipeline and producer access to markets often controlled by major interstate pipeline
systems. To some extent, this has already occurred. Since
1980, the Commission has included an express condition in
certificates issued to pipelines operating on the Outer Continental Shelf, requiring that they transport gas in accordance
with 1the provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
3

Act.

2

The Mineral Leasing Act provisions, discussed previously,

22

provide potentially an even greater opportunity to

facilitate interstate pipeline access for producers, distributors and other pipelines. To the extent that gas pipelines located on federal lands are required to transport without discrimination gas delivered to them for shipment, the implications in some markets would be dramatic. In eleven western
states the federal government owns land, ranging from
33.5% of the state in New Mexico to 87.6% in Nevada. 23 In
Alaska, the U.S. Government owns over 90% of the acreage
in the state.324 A presumption of essentiality or monopoly
power might appropriately be applied to lines located in
320. A condition requiring the applicant to wheel government power over the
licensed project's primary lines has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952).
61,158 (1981);
321. See, e.g., Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 17 F.E.R.C.
61,077 (1981); Transcontinental
Southern Natural Gas Co., 17 F.E.R.C.
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 17 F.E.R.C. 1 61,044 (1971).
(1981).
322. See supra notes 260-70 and acompanying text.
323. See Note, supra note 266, at 507 (citing DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU
OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 10 (1977)).
324. 1d.
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these areas, justifying a simplified certification procedure
under which access conditions might readily attach.
Aside from the conditions discussed above, the permissible limits of contract carriage conditions that may be
imposed on a gas pipeline are suggested by the decision in
Chapman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,"2 5 noted earlier. In
Chapman, the court rejected the Secretary of the Interior's
proposed conditions for the grant of a right-of-way to El
Paso on the grounds that they exceeded his bare authority to
require the gas pipeline to operate as a common carrier.
Interestingly, the court noted that the Secretary's proposed
right-of-way conditions were more properly described as
terms of contract, rather than common, carriage. 121 So construed, the conditions merit examination as a basis for defining reasonable contract carriage conditions on a section 7
certificate.
Under the conditions imposed by the Secretary in Chapman, the pipeline would have been required (1) to provide
firm transportation service to shippers, whether or not the
gas shipped was produced from federal lands, (2) to make
available any unused capacity for this purpose, and (3) to file
rates, terms, and conditions for the service and, where necessary, file appropriate certificate applications with the regulatory authority having jurisdiction over the matter.127 In

addition, where there was no unused capacity, the pipeline
would have been required to seek authorization from the
pertinent regulatory agency to expand capacity provided (1)
that expansion would be limited to no greater amount than
had been devoted to private carriage, and (2) that the pipeline could demand assurance from the prospective shipper
that it had adequate markets and would agree to transport
its gas over the pipeline's facilities in such amounts and for
such periods as would "be sufficient to pay the construction
and operation costs allocable to his shipments plus a reason3 2 8able return on the investment allocable to such shipments.
325. 204 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; See supra note 262.
326. Id. at 51-52.

327. Id at 49 n.4.
828. Id. at 50.
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Regarding the latter requirements for pipeline expansion, the court noted that while the stipulations urged
by the Secretary were intended to enforce common carriage,
they would actually defeat the asserted purpose because they
provide for contractual arrangements between shipper and
pipeline, in advance of construction, which immediately remove any new capacity from availability for common carriage."' The reliance placed by the court upon contractual
relations is significant. It supports, indirectly at least, the
proposition that gas certificates may be conditioned to require the certified pipeline to transport for others, provided that contractual arrangements are recognized and
permitted.
The limitations of section 7 of the Natural Gas Act
on expansion of pipeline capacity, " ' moreover, need not pre329. Id. at 52.
330. 15 U.S.C. § 717f provides in relevant part:
(a) Whenever the Commission, after notice and opportunity
for hearing, finds such action necesary or desirable in the public
interest, it may by order direct a natural-gas company to extend
or improve its transportation facilities, to establish physical connection of its transportation facilities with the facilities of, and
sell natural gas to, any person or muncipality engaged or legally
authorized to engage in the local distribution of natural or artificial gas to the public, and for such purpose to extend its transportation facilities to communities immediately adjacent to such
facilities or to territory served by such natural-gas company, if
the Commission finds that no undue burden will be placed upon
such natural-gas company thereby: Provided, That the Commission shall have no authority to compel the enlargement of transportation facilities for such purposes, or to compel such naturalgas company to establish physical connection or sell natural gas
when to do so would impair its ability to render adequate service
to its customers.
The Third Circuit in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FPC, held that
the Section 7(a) limitations on the expansion of pipeline capacity carried
over into other provisions of the Act. 204 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1953). But
see, Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 173
F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1949). Section 7(a) itself addresses compulsory
interconnections between a pipeline and new wholesale customers. It has
been interpreted not to authorize the Commission to compel the pipeline
to purchase or to transport gas for others. See Chandeleur Pipe Line Co.,
44 F.P.C. 1747 (1970), a! 'd sub nom., Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. v.
FPC, 463 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Tarpon Oil Corp., 26 F.P.C. 635
(1961). Tarpon Oil however, presented an interesting factual situation.
There, certain producers sought to acquire an existing pipeline in order to
facilitate the transportation of their gas to market. The presiding examiner
had found that the producers only sought to acquire the pipeline because
they bad been refusdd transportation service by its existing owners. He
also noted that under the acquisition proposal the pipeline's former owners
would get a discount on transportation service from the new owners. As
a consequence he denied the certificate, but suggested that the applicants
could obtain transportation service by filing a Section 7(a) application.
The Commission reversed the initial decision, holding that Section 7(a)
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sent insuperable obstacles to providing broader access for
the pipeline's competitors. So long as the stability of contractual relationships is protected, the Commission may prorate pipeline capacity. 3 ' More importantly, it would seem
intuitive that to the extent existing or proposed pipeline
capacity is adequate to serve the supply needs of a given
market, the grant of access to a new shipper for that market
results in a substitution of suppliers, not in the need to expand existing pipeline capacity.3 ' Where there is already
excess capacity, the issue does not even arise.
Gas pipeline certification proceedings provide an important forum for addressing access issues. Given the frequency
of requests for certificate amendments and the need for
approval of new pipeline facilities, there are numerous opportunities to examine those issues. Hydroelectric licensing,
by contrast, does not involve every jurisdictional electric
utility. Many have no hydroelectric resources. Still, there
exist significant opportunities to examine the licensing conditions of new licenses as well as opportunities to reexamine
existing license conditions as old licenses come up for
renewal."3 3
The key question in such cases would seem to be the extent of the Commission's authority to impose access conditions extending beyond the scope of the licensed project
itself. It is, for example, firmly established that the Commission may require wheeling over those of the licensee's
transmission lines that extend from the licensed project.334

331.
332.

333.
334.

did not authorize an order to compel transportation and that, under the
circumstances approval of the certificate was the best alternative. Id. at
639. The Commission did not appear to consider any of the other alternatives suggested in this article.
See sup - note 306.
Arguably, there may be circumstances under which the supplying pipeline
has contractual obligations to take gas from producers or pay anyway,
which circumstances may force the pipeline to store such gas in the pipeline itself if no other adequate storage exists. A competitive solution to
this problem may be for the pipeline to reduce its price for the gas it sells
(e.g., accept a lower return), inducing the customer to change its mind
about switching gas suppliers.
Licenses under the Federal Power Act may be granted for a maximum of
fifty years. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1976). Many of the licenses granted in the
two decades after the Act's passage are only now coming up for renewal.
FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952) (holding that the FPC's
authority under Section 4(g), 10(a) or 6 of the Federal Power Act would
justify such conditions).
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Whether the licensing power would permit wheeling conditions to attach to the licensee's entire transmission network is
uncertain."3 5 That question however, is currently being litigated in a case before the Commission, where the intervenors
and Commission staff have urged attachment of license conditions, including wheeling requirements, to restrict the licensee's alleged monopoly power."'
D. Imprudent or inefficient practices
Public utilities have an obligation to operate their business in a reasonable, prudent and efficient manner for the
benefit of their customers.3" This well established principle
may have practical application to access questions in those
cases where electric utilities or gas pipelines have significant
unused capacity. The question in such cases is whether the
utility's or pipeline's failure to seek the business of willing,
would-be customers constitutes imprudence or inefficiency.
The cases suggest that management imprudence or inefficiency is a broad concept. Thus, clearly excessive payments for various inputs can be disallowed. 8 ' The cases likewise suggest that while management decisions, prudent when
made, will not be judged by hindsight,"' the failure to make
335. Western Mass. Elec. Co. 39 F.P.C. 723 (1968), aff'd sub nom., Municipal
Elec. Ass'n v FPC, 414 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 55 F.P.C. 1543, 1552 n.26 (1976).
336. On April 1, 1976, the Commission granted intervention to the Northern
California Power Agency (NCPA) in a license proceeding involving Pacific
Gas and Electric Company's license to operate a pumped storage project.
NCPA, an organization of municipal electric systems, had charged PG&E
with acting to maintain and increase its monopoly over transmission and
generation in northern and central California by means of various contractual arrangements and refusals to deal. The Commission held that
while a license would be granted to PG&E, it would be issued subject to
any conditions within the FPC's power deemed necessary to restrict the
Company's monopoly power, if, after hearing it were determined that a
"situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws or the policies clearly underlying those laws" were found to exist. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 55 F.P.C.
1543 (1976). At the time of this writing both the NCPA and the FERC
trial staff, of which the author is a member, had filed briefs in the case
urging the imposition of broad license conditions. NCPA's Initial Brief,
FERC Project Nos. 2735, 233 and 1988 (filed March 2, 1982) ; FERC Staff's
Initial Brief (filed March 2, 1982).
337. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63 (1935);
Transworld Airlines v. CAB, 385 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 944 (1967); Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 388 F.2d
444 (7th Cir. 1968); cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968).
338. Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936).
339. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63 (1935);
Metzenbaum v. Columbia Gas Transmission Co., 4 F.E.R.C. 1 61,277 (1978).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/1

74

Reiter: Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract C
CONTRACT CARRIER REGULATION

1983

cost efficient decisions may be reflected in reduced rate allowances. 4 In that sense, lost savings opportunities as well
expenditures can be attributed to the utilas unnecessary
ity. 4'
It is through the concept of foregone savings that prudent management principles may affect the availability of
pipeline and transmission facilities. In Public Service Co.
4 2 the Commission stated that prudent manageof Indiana,"
ment obligations might require public utilities to seek costsaving power pooling opportunities, and hinted that the failure to seek reasonably available savings might be examined
in future rate cases. 43 The reasonable implication to be
drawn from the Commission's statements is that underutilization of pipeline and transmission capacity may also
be open to examination. 4 Full utilization of facilities, to
the extent that revenues from new customers can cover variable costs and defray fixed ones, may be deemed the prudent
course, with foregone revenues attributed to the pipeline or
utility involved.
This is not to suggest that claims of imprudence will
always be successful. There may be legitimate reasons for
maintaining unused capacity, for example. Or, the utility or
pipeline may simply accept the rate penalty rather than provide access to a competitor.4 3 Moreover, whether or not a
340. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
341. Id. The Court suggests for example, that reduced productivity of minority
employees resulting from low morale due to racial discrimination could be
imputed to the utility, as could revenues forfeited by loss of government
contracts.
342. 10 F.E.R.C.
61,236 (1980).
343. Id. at 61,434.
344. The Commission has hinted at such an approach in the preamble to its rule
on Certification of Pipeline Transportation for Certain High Priority Uses,
FERC Order No. 27, noting that where pipelines have excess capacity not
being utilized to meet current customer needs, transportation arrangements
offer the pipelines a chance to use such capacity and reduce ratepayer
burden. See supra note 304. As the Commission stated:
If an interstate pipeline is unwilling to avail itself of such opportunities, it becomes difficult to see why the ratepayer should continue to bear this burden. However, if necessary, such considerations are best addressed in individual rate proceedings where all
the facts can be developed.
FERC Regulations Preambles, 1977-81,
30,049, 30,348 (1979).
345. The existence of this option argues against the contention that might be
made that an imprudent remedy would be compelling indirectly that
which the Commission could not order directly. See, e.g., NAACP v. FPC,
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bottleneck exists should have some bearing on the obligation to provide access. Thus, absent monopoly power,
the refusal to deal may simply be a reasonable election by
the pipeline or utility involved. On the other hand, where
the essential nature of the facility is demonstrated, the refusal to serve for anticompetitive reasons, and the loss of
revenues suffered as a result, might indeed support a rate
reduction based on a finding of imprudence.
A WORD ABOUT OTHER AccEss OPTIONS

Electric or gas systems denied access to transmission or
transportation networks are not confined to the access options discussed on the previous pages. In the author's opinion, the NGA and FPA provisions cited previously are likely
to be the most important vehicles for addressing access
claims. However, legislative solutions aside, several other
alternatives may be viable.
Antitrust actions are a clear possibility. The Otter Tail
litigation is a prime example of the successful application of
the Sherman Act to remedy refusals to wheel power. The
negative implications of this approach, however, are the considerable expense and protracted nature of antitrust proceedings (although litigants before administrative agencies
may not always fare much better in this regard). Moreover,
particularly in gas cases, the complications arising out of
primary jurisdiction claims may put the issue right back
in the administrative setting in any event. 4
Two other options may also be available to electric utilities. Under the provisions of the Public Utilities Regulatory
425 U.S. 662 (1976) (suggesting that although the FPC had no direct
mandate to enforce public policies against racial discrimination, it could
reduce utility rates which were excessive due to discrimination suit back
pay awards, lost government contracts attributable to racially discrimi-

natory policies, etc.)
346. See, e.g., Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d
380 (9th Cir. 1953) (Plaintiff's allegation that defendant unlawfully refused to transport its gas in violation of Sherman Act, Mineral Leasing
Act and Natural Gas Act dismissed for plaintiff's failure to exhaust remedies befores the FPC). But see City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Michigan
Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978)

(suggesting that, at least with respect to electric utilities, there may be
no primary jurisdiction issue to delay the antitrust action).
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Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), the FERC was given certain
authority to compel wheeling by a utility upon the application of any other electric utility, a geothermal power producer, or a federal power marketing agency, including the
authority to order enlargement of existing transmission capacity. 4 7 The requirements for approval of a wheeling order,
however, are formidable; an application must demonstrate,
inter alia, proof of significant energy conservation, 48 improved reliability for any affected system, ' reasonable preservation of "existing competitive relationships," 3 0 and that
no affected party will suffer "a reasonably ascertainable uncompensated economic loss." ''
To date, only two PURPA applications have been
filed. " 2 The American Public Power Association, an
organization representing many of the nation's municipally-owned electric utilities--those entities most likely
to seek wheeling orders-reportedly regards present PURPA
language as making wheeling orders under PURPA virtually "impossible to secure."3' ' Moreover, under the statute's terms, the FERC can act only upon application.
Indeed, when the court vacated the FERC's order in NYSEG
and instructed the Commission that any relief to Penn Yan
could only come after a PURPA wheeling order, the Commission had no option but to invite Penn Yan to file a PURPA
request for wheeling to the thirty excluded customers."3 ' The
PURPA wheeling option, to the extent that it was intended
347. Pub. L. No. 95-617 (1978), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-294 (1980); 16
U.S.C. § 824j, k (1980).
348. 16 U.S.C. § 824j (a) (2) (A) (Supp. IV 1980).
349. 16 U.S.C. § 824j (a) (2) (C) (Supp. IV 1980).
350. 16 U.S.C. § 824j (b) (2) (c) (1) (Supp. IV 1980).
351. 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a) (1) (Supp. IV 1980).
352. Central Power & Light Co., No. EL79-8, (settled in 1981) 17 F.E.R.C.
61,078 (Oct. 28, 1981) and Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., No. EL80-7, 16 F.E.R.C. 1 63,051 (1981) (Initial Decision denying
application, appeal pending).
353. APPA Priorities: Clarify Water Act, Limit Use of CWIP, Broaden
Wheeling, ELEC. WK., Mar. 8, 1982, at 7.
354. Village of Penn Yan, 18 F.E.R.C. 61,105 (1982). An interesting sidelight
to the case is that the wheeling limitations which the Commission had
originally stricken (but were later reinstated by the Second Circuit's decision) were deleted by NYSEG in its revised contracts with PASNY,
which contracts had been entered into one week prior to the FERC's order
on remand. Comments of NYSEG on the Commission's Order on Remand,
FERC No. EL78-29 (filed Mar. 10, 1982).
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to encourage and facilitate transmission access, is so far
largely a failure.
Finally, mention needs to be made of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing process. Under section
105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act, virtually all nuclear
power plant license applicants are subject to pre-licensing
antitrust review by the NRC and the Attorney General.35
When a hearing is actually held by the NRC, the agency must
determine whether "the activities under the license will create
or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust
laws." 5 ' There can be little doubt that the pre-licensing review process has had a substantial impact on transmission
access conditions for smaller systems. Since 1970, ninety such
license applications have been reviewed by the Justice Department and the NRC. 57 As a result of the review process, over
thirty utilities have accepted or had imposed by order license
conditions,"5 8 most of these requiring some form of licensee
wheeling obligation for neighboring systems. 5 The utilities reviewed account for over 80 percent of the industry's
00
kilowatt-hour sales.
Despite these impressive statistics, the likelihood that
the NRC will continue to serve as a significant forum for
the litigation of transmission access issues is small, at least
for the foreseeable future. NRC authority necessarily hinges
on license applications.3 ' No utilities have placed orders for
new nuclear power plants in the United States since 1978.362
355. 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1) (1970). For a discussion of the procedures developed by the Justice Department, see Saunders, Antitrust and Nuclear Power
Supply: A Resume of Twenty-one Months' Activities Under the Preliminary Review Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 14 ATOM. ENERGY L.J.
204 (1972).
356. 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c)(5) (1970).
357. THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMN'S ANTITRUST REVIEW PROCESS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS 8 (Transcomm, Inc. Prepared for the Department of Energy, DOE Contract No. DE-ACO1-79PE-70025, June, 1981).
358. Id.
359. Id. at 9.
360. II NATIONAL POWER GRID STUDY ch. 14 at 375 (Technical Study Reports,
DOE-ERA-0056-2, September, 1979).
361. It does have continuing authority to enforce its license conditions. For a
discussion of the NRC's enforcement activities see THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'NS ANTITRUST REVIEW PROCESS, supra note 357, at 46-49.
362. Chrysler, When a Nuclear Plant Strangles in Red Tape, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. 59 (Apr. 6, 1981).'
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In 1980, in fact, there were sixteen cancellations; one utility
cancelled its order in 1981.803 General Electric reportedly
expects no new domestic reactor orders for ten years; the
company's two major U.S. competitors, Westinghouse and
Combustion Engineering, foresee none for the next four to
five years. 0 4 Under these circumstances, the opportunities
for NRC antitrust review and for redress of transmission
access claims are virtually non-existent.
CONCLUSION

Rapidly escalating prices for natural gas and electric
energy charged by major gas pipelines and electric utilities
have forced consumers, particularly gas and electric distribution systems, to increasingly seek a means to contain their
costs. Competitive solutions, i.e., reliance on market forces,
depend upon the availability of supply options. Access to the
wholesale supplier's gas pipeline system or electric transmission network is often essential to any customer plan for
the development or acquisition of alternative gas or energy
sources.
The ability of the FERC to cope with the many and complicated issues arising out of customer attempts to reduce
their traditional reliance upon neighboring wholesale suppliers is sure to be tested in the coming years. This will be
no simple task, for utilities and pipelines with a competitive
stake in the retention of customer loads are just as sure to
resist inroads into their market positions.
The extent to which decisions such as NYSEG and
FP&L may serve to constrain the Commission's flexibility
in these matters remains uncertain, as does the possibility
that severe constraints may lead to legislative solutions.
Both the Fifth and Second Circuit decisions rest upon mistaken notions about the permissible scope of contract carriage regulation of electric utilities and gas pipelines under
the Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts. A judicious,
363. Francis, Nuclear-Power Advocates See a Real Need for New Plants by

1990's, CHRIST. SCI. MON. 11 (Sept. 9, 1981).
364. Nuclear Engineering--Shock Therapy, 4 THE ECONOMIST 89 (Jan. 8, 1982).
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reasoned application of traditional antitrust and public utility regulatory principles can provide the framework for litigation of access claims and can preserve the FERC as an
important forum in which pipeline transportation arrangements and wheeling agreements can be fostered to encourage competition.
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